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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
SANDRA BEYNON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
ST. GEORGE - DIXIE LODGE 
# 1743, BENEVOLENT & 
PROTECTIVE ORDER OP ELKS, 
Defendant/Appellee 
Case No. 91-0551 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE PHILIP EVES, JUDGE PRESIDING 
Trial Court Case No. 90-050-3229 
Plaintiff\Appellant, SANDRA BEYNON, by and through her 
counsel of record John Pace and Brian M. Barnard of the Utah 
Legal Clinic on behalf of the Utah Civil Rights and 
Liberties Foundation, Inc., submits the following REPLY 
BRIEF in further support of her appeal. 
1 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
In its version of the facts of this case, defendant\ 
appellee, St, George-Dixie Lodge #1743, Benevolent and 
Protective Order of Elks (hereinafter the "Lodge" or "Elks 
Lodge"), lists several "supplemental" facts allegedly 
admitted by Ms. Beynon for the purposes of defendant's 
motion for summary judgment. The Lodge's insistence that 
these facts are now undisputed is misleading. Although Ms. 
Beynon admitted certain facts in response to defendant's 
motion for summary judgment, these acknow-ledgments were 
made in conjunction with Ms. Beynon's own factual 
statements, many of which contradicted, modified and/or 
augmented her "admissions". Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion for SSummary Judgment ("Plaintiff's 
Response Memorandum") at 2-9; T.R. 1116.1 
For example, while Ms. Beynon conceded that the Lodge 
has selective membership criteria and is not open to the 
general public, (Appellee's Brief at 42), at the same time, 
she established from members' testimony that the Lodge is 
not genuinely particular in applying its standards and 
1
 Importantly, the trial court judge did not refer to 
these additional details in his statement of the undisputed 
facts pertinent to the resolution of this case. Hearing 
Transcript at 36-37, T.R. 1254; Memorandum Decision at 
unnumbered p. 2-3, T.R. 1196. In addition, at the summary 
judgment hearing, plaintiff's counsel did not stipulate to 
any specific facts, although he did agree that facts 
enumerated by the judge were crucial. 
2 
admits all, or nearly all, males who request membership. 
Plaintiff's Response Memorandum at 4, T.R. at 1118 ("The 
plaintiff denies the conclusory statement that Athe Lodge is 
very selective as to those whom it admits as members.' The 
degree of selectivity may be a question to be determined by 
this Court.")• Ms. Beynon also agreed that the Lodge is 
incorporated as a non-profit enterprise, but she did so 
while attesting to the obvious commercial nature of the 
Elks' operation. Id. at 5, T.R. 1120; Appellant's Brief at 
6-13. Though Ms. Beynon agrees that the Elks Lodge is not 
open to the public to the extent that any member of the 
general public can walk in off the street, Ms. Beynon has 
consistently demonstrated the Elks maintain sufficient 
openness and contact with the public to require application 
of the Utah Civil Rights Act to its discriminatory conduct. 
Id. 
Additionally, Ms. Beynon agrees that Elks Lodge 
regulations specify that the "Lodge members cannot use their 
membership to further business pursuits." Appellee's Brief 
at 43. However, Ms. Beynon produced members' testimony 
confirming that despite this rule, business matters are 
discussed and business contacts made at the Lodge and during 
Elks Lodge events. Appellant's Brief at 12. In addition, 
members play host for business meetings and company training 
events. Id. Finally, while the Lodge insists that its 
3 
"central" activity is the Tuesday night meeting closed to 
women, the appellee itself touts its extensive involvement 
in the community as a charitable organization and as a 
vehicle for encouraging patriotism and community 
responsibility as other fundamental purposes of its 
organization. Appellee's Brief at 47-48. 
Thus, although Ms. Beynon conceded certain facts 
concerning the nature of the Lodge, these admissions were 
made along with Ms. Beynon's assertions and proof that the 
Lodge is public enough and commercial enough to be subject 
to Utah's anti-discrimination statute. More importantly, 
potentially unspecified admissions should not replace legal 
conclusions which go to the core of this dispute. Warfield 
v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club. 262 Cal.Rptr. 890, 893 fn. 
4 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989)(counsel's statements during a 
hearing);2 Irwin v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 184 
Cal.Rptr. 288 (Cal.App. 1982). Despite conceding that the 
Elks Lodge is a non-profit, "private" corporation, Ms. 
Beynon is free to contend and has always contended that the 
2
 In Peninsula Golf, the California Court specifically 
refused to consider counsel's "admission" (the Court's 
quotations) that defendant was M*truly a private membership 
club'" as conclusive of the club's private status for the 
purposes of determining whether defendant was a business 
establishment under the Unruh Civil Rights Act: "Having 
examined the purported admission, we conclude counsel's 
statement was at best ambiguous and cannot serve as a 
factual substitute for the vigorously contested question of 
overarching significance." Id. 
4 
Lodge is a business for the purposes of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act and is insufficiently private to be entitled to 
First Amendment immunity from the state's anti-discrim-
ination mandate, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Lodge's plea to be exempt from the Utah Civil 
Rights Act devalues the critical policy interests and 
liberal reach of the anti-discrimination statute. By 
guaranteeing individuals full and equal access to all 
business establishments and enterprises regulated by the 
state, regardless of gender, Utah lawmakers branded gender 
discrimination as particularly threatening to the health and 
welfare of the state's citizens. This directive is to spare 
individuals the affront and humiliation brought on by gender 
discrimination. In addition, the uncompromising language of 
the civil rights act mandates that the state — more so than 
any other actor — be conspicuously removed from those who 
practice any invidious discrimination, preventing any 
benefits or advantages bestowed by the state from being used 
to aid unlawful discrimination. 
Accordingly, to further Utah's compelling interest in 
eradicating invidious discrimination in business establish-
ments and businesses licensed by the state to sell beer and 
alcohol, the Lodge's discriminatory conduct must cease. 
5 
Indeed, case law which has interpreted statutory language 
identical to the text of the Utah Civil Rights Act uniformly 
confirms that the statute forbids the Lodge's discriminatory 
practices. Further, the Lodge — engaged in public and 
commercial activities and the beneficiary of state beer and 
liquor licenses — has submitted itself to state supervision 
and relinquished its right to First Amendment protection 
from state regulation. Utah law prevents the Lodge from 
simultaneously engaging in open commercial discrimination 
and profiting from special state advantages while claiming 
immunity from the reach of state law. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Elks Lodge is Business Regulated by the State, 
Subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
All relevant considerations conclusively establish that 
the Lodge is an enterprise regulated by the state for the 
purposes of the Utah Civil Rights Act. Given its two state 
alcohol licenses — one to sell beer, one to sell liquor — 
the Lodge cannot earnestly deny that it is subject to the 
state anti-discrimination law as a business that enjoys 
special state benefits. 
First, application of fundamental principles of 
statutory construction discredit the Lodge's claim. The 
authors of the Utah Civil Rights Act specifically required 
6 
that the act be "liberally construed with a view to promote 
the policy and purposes of the act and to promote justice." 
U.C.A. § 13-7-1 (1953 as amended). Subsequently, lawmakers 
amended the act to prohibit sexual discrimination and to 
include within the reach of statute enterprises regulated by 
the state. 1973 Utah Laws 18 (amendment made for the 
express purpose of "[d]efining and extending the application 
of the act to enterprises regulated by the state and . . . 
to prevent discrimination on the basis of gender"). Never-
theless, the Lodge would have this Court ignore that 
straightforward legislative intent which expanded the scope 
of the anti-discrimination statute. Unless a broad meaning 
is attached to the phrase "business which sell beer," the 
amendment would add nothing to the Act which already 
prohibited discrimination in all business establishments. 
The Lodge would have the meaning of the word "business" in 
the provision concerning "business establishments" and in 
the provision "business which sell beer" be identical. For 
example, Appellee's Brief at 13. Such an interpretation 
would render the entire provision added in 1973 concerning 
state regulated businesses that sell beer and alcohol 
superfluous, would frustrate legislative intent, and would 
be in violation of the most rudimentary axiom of statutory 
construction. Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 370 P.2d 
313, 316 (Calif. 1962) (declaring in the context of the 
7 
Unruh Civil Rights Act that "a court must construe 
[statutes] so as to give force and effect to all their 
provisions11); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 
934# 936 (Utah 1990).3 
Second, the Lodge declines to acknowledge the import of 
the policy and purposes further by the 1973 amendment to the 
Utah Civil Rights Act. Recognizing the harm and threat to 
the health, safety and general welfare of Utah caused by 
invidious discrimination, lawmakers determined that all 
enterprises subject to certain listed state laws must abide 
by this anti-discrimination mandate. The state did not want 
to be associated with, nor lend aid or support to those 
persons that practice invidious discrimination. Lawmakers 
determined that when discrimination has the appearance of 
state aid, authorization or sanction, it is particular 
harmful and damaging. Such a conclusion is compelled by 
3
 The Lodge presents an alternative reading of the 
statute which would also frustrate legislative intent, 
suggesting that the private club exemption under the 
definition of "places of public accommodation," U.C.A. § 13-
7-2 (1), somehow applies to the entire act. Appellee's 
Brief at 10. Although the Utah legislature has clearly 
demonstrated its ability to create and specify exemptions 
when it so desires, the Lodge would second guess the 
legislative decision not to exempt clubs from the definition 
of enterprises regulated by the state. U.C.A. § 13-7-2 
(3)(b); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.. 707 P.2d 
212, 219 (Cal. 1985) (rejecting an almost identical argument 
saying "the Legislature knows how to draft such an exception 
when it wishes to."). 
8 
examination of the statute's structure4 and legislative 
history.5 
Concern as to an appearance of state support or 
affiliation with those entities that practice invidious 
discrimination is not unique to Utah lawmakers. Because 
federal equal protection provisions prohibit a state from 
acting on the basis of unlawful classifications, courts are 
vigilant for instances where state involvement in 
discrimination is sufficient to violate federal equal 
protection. Although the case at bar is brought under state 
law which has no "state action" requirement, it is 
enlightening to examine the details of Cornelius v. 
4
 All the enterprises listed under U.C.A. § 13-7-2(3) 
were included because they are subject to regulation under 
other specific provisions of state law. Yet, a institution 
subject to regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Credit Code could never claim exemption from the civil 
rights act because it is not an "institution", nor could an 
insurer regulated by the Insurance Code plead exemption 
because it is not an "insurer", nor could a "public utility" 
regulated by the Public Utilities Act claim that because it 
is not really a public utility it can freely discriminate. 
In all these cases, simply because governed by the relevant 
law, the entity in question is subject to the act. 
Accordingly, simply because the Lodge has a license to sell 
beer and one to sell liquor, and is thus subject to state 
regulation, it must conform to the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
5
 For discussion of legislative history see Amicus 
Brief of the Attorney General in Peters v. Alta Club, Utah 
Supreme Court No. 86046, attached as Exhibit "P"; 
Appellant's Brief at 20-21 (quoting legislative testimony 
indicating that lawmakers considered the Alta Club, a non-
profit, private liquor club, to be a place of business that 
sells beer and alcohol). 
9 
Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 
(1974) (an Elks Lodge may be a private club for the purposes 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) ,6 a case often cited by the 
Lodge. In a federal equal protection challenge, the 
Cornelius Court carefully analyzed a claim that the state's 
exemption of the Elks Lodge from its business corporation 
tax was unconstitutional encouragement of invidious 
discrimination. Although plaintiff's claim was rendered 
moot when the Elks Lodge ended its "de jure" discrimina-
tion,7 the Court cautioned that "[w]hatever the freedom of 
legitimate Elks and Moose lodges to discriminated racially 
with respect to membership, if they do they stand to forfeit 
state aid, direct or indirect, which amounts to 
xencouragement.'" Cornelius 382 F. Supp. at 1204. The 
Court also warned the Elks Lodge that its "limited immunity" 
as a private club under federal law was non-commercial in 
6
 The Lodge inappropriately cites Cornelius to support 
6its claim that it is not a "business establishment." 
Appellee's Brief at 16-18. However, the passages of 
Cornelius quoted or referred to never mention the term 
"business establishment." This is because Cornelius 
involves equal protection law and federal civil rights 
legislation, neither of which contain reference to the term 
"business establishment." Instead, Cornelius discusses 
issues such as state action, the definition of "public 
accommodation" and the private club exemption from Title II 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 
7
 The Court specifically kept open the possibility 
that if "de facto" discrimination were demonstrated, that 
the defendant lodge would be liable. Cornelius, 382 F. 
Supp. at 1192. 
10 
nature and was dependant upon a showing that the club 
"function[s] as an extension of members' homes . . . ." Id, 
at 1204-1205. 
Although Cornelius was based on federal equal 
protection claims and federal public accommodation law, the 
case lends support to Ms. Beynon's claims under Utah law. 
Importantly, the case associates minimal state involvement -
- conveyance of tax exempt status — with state encourage-
ment of discrimination. Given this reasoning, when Utah 
bestows the benefit of licenses to sell beer and alcohol — 
activities which every Utahn knows to be the subject of 
extensive state regulation — upon an entity engaging in 
gender discrimination, the State is undoubtedly linking 
itself to, if not aiding and encouraging, this discrim-
ination. Understandably, this is the exact result that Utah 
lawmakers determined to avoid with the 1973 amendment to the 
state civil rights act. Indeed, Utah lawmakers determined 
that whenever extensive state regulation entangled the state 
in the affairs of a monitored enterprise, discrimination 
could not be tolerated for fear that this undesirable 
conduct would be encouraged by or associated with the 
state7s presence and support. 
Further, as the Cornelius court cautioned, when a 
private association is a business and ceases to be an 
extension of members7 living rooms, it loses its immunity 
11 
from federal regulation. Because Utah does not allow 
homeowners to sell beer <md alcohol from the privacy of 
their residences, the state does not recognize an enterprise 
licensed to sell alcohol and beer as a protected private 
entity. By applying for and accepting the privilege of 
selling spirits, the Lodge relinquished its privacy claim 
and properly become the subject of state anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
B. The Elks Lodge is A Business Establishment Subject to 
the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
The Lodge seeks to avoid the mandate of the Utah Civil 
Rights Act by insisting that it is neither a business that 
sells beer and alcohol nor a business establishment. As set 
out above, there is ample evidence, both textual and 
contextual, to establish that any holder of ci state business 
license to sell beer or liquor is, for that reason alone, an 
enterprise regulated by the state for the purposes of the 
Utah Civil Rights Act. However, there is further support 
for Ms. Beynon's claims. Examination of relevant defin-
itions of "business" — particularly those evoked in the 
context of civil rights legislation — indicates that the 
Lodge is a business and therefore is a business 
establishment and a business that sells beer and liquor. 
Importantly, precedent which confirms this conclusion comes 
12 
from California courts which have interpreted the term 
"business establishments" in the context of their Unruh 
Civil Rights Act.8 In contrast, the Lodge attempts to make 
its case herein with definitions from sources such as tax 
litigation and anti-trust litigation and cites federal and 
state civil rights cases that involve interpretation of 
language greatly different from that of the Utah statute. 
For example, federal public accommodations law prohibits 
discrimination only in "places of public accommodation" and 
specifically excludes application of the statute to private 
clubs. Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 
382 F. Supp. 1182 (1974); Moose Lodge #107 v. Irvis. 407 
U.S. 163 (1972). The scope of Oregon civil rights law is 
also limited to "places of public accommodation" and does 
not extend to bona fide clubs. ORS 3 0.675; Schwnek v. Boy 
Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 465 (1976); Llovds Lions Club v 
Int. Association of Lions Clubs. 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986) 
8
 The Unruh Act provides in pertinent part: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of this 
state are free and equal, and no matter what 
their sex . . . are entitled to the full and 
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, 
privileges, or services in all business 
establishments of every kind whatsoever. 
California Civil Code § 51 (West 1982). 
N.B: The Utah Act shares both the "all business 
establishments" and "whatsoever" language with the Unruh 
Act. U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as amended). 
13 
(Lions Club subject to Oregon public accommodations act). 
While the provisions of the Oregon statute have been 
interpreted by the state's Supreme Court to prohibit 
discrimination "by business or commercial enterprises which 
offer goods or services to the public," Schwenk, 551 P.2d at 
468 (emphasis original), this language is not contained in 
the text of the statute. Thus, while not totally 
irrelevant, the cases relied upon by the Lodge are less 
instructive and are of less precedental value than those 
from California Courts who have dealt with a text identical 
to that which is before this Court. 
Analysis of California civil rights law indicates that 
courts in that state have, in response to legislative intent 
to widen the reach of the Unruh Act, continually interpret 
the term "business establishment" as broadly as reasonably 
possible. Burks v. Poppy Construction Company, 370 P.2d 313 
(Cal. 1962) (seller of tract housing a "business establish-
ment") ; O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Association, 662 
P.2d 427 (Cal. 1983) (condominium asso-ciation, a non-profit 
association, a "business establishment"); Isbister v. Boys/ 
Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 707 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985) (Boys' 
Club, a private, non-profit corporation, affiliated with the 
Boys7 Club of America, a "business establishment"); Curran 
v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts, 195 Cal.Rptr. 325 
(Cal.App.2 Dist. 1983) (Boy Scouts, a non-profit 
14 
organization a "business establishment"); Rotary Club of 
Duarte v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary International, 224 
Cal.Rptr. 213 (Cal.App.2 Dist. 1986), Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary 
International v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (Rotary 
Club, a private, non-profit corporation, a "business 
establishment); Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 
262 Cal.Rptr. 890 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1989) (a non-profit, 
privately owned and operated, social and recreational club a 
"business establishment"). In at least these five 
instances, the California Courts included within the meaning 
of "business establishments" non-profit corporations. Id. 
In three of these cases, the non-profit corporations were 
also private entities, not open to the general public. 
Isbister, supra; Rotary Club, supra, Peninsula Golf, supra. 
In rejoinder to the Lodge's false contention that Ms. Beynon 
can cite no precedent for her claim that appellee is a 
"business", she points to the cases cited above — cases 
which directly contradict the Lodge's claim that "[i]n order 
to be a xbusiness' an entity must either be open to the 
public or operate for profit." Appellee's Brief at 9. 
For example, in Isbister, 707 P.2d at 218, the 
California Supreme Court specifically rejected the Boys' 
Club argument that "profit-seeking be a sine qua non for 
coverage of the [Unruh] Act" and even held that a non-
commercial entity could be subject to the civil rights 
15 
provision: "[t]he fact that [the Boys' Club's] purposes and 
operations are not strictly commercial does not bar a 
conclusion that it is a *business establishment' to which 
the Act applies." Id. at 219 (footnote omitted).9 The 
California Court next held that although the Boys' Club was 
a private entity, it was indeed a business. Id. at 216-218. 
Because the membership criteria adopted by the Boys' Club 
functioned to exclude only girls from its facilities, the 
Club's discriminatory membership policies were covered by 
the Unruh Act. See, United States Jaycees v. McClure, 3 05 
N.W.2d 764, 768-769 (Minn. 1981); Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (local chapters of the Jaycees 
held to be "business facilities" for the purpose of the 
Minnesota Civil Rights Act although a nonprofit membership 
organization); Lloyds Lions Club v. Int. Association of 
Lions Clubs, 724 P.2d 887 (Or.App. 1986), petition for 
review dismissed, 740 P.2d 182 (Or. 1987) (nonprofit, 
private, selective membership club). 
9
 Interesting, the Isbister Court specifically 
rejected the interpretation of "business" which, on the 
basis of a definition provided in Burks, supra (business 
defined as a "calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for 
the purpose of making a livelihood or gain"), and cited 
herein by the Lodge, would limit the reach of the Unruh Act 
to profit-making entities. Isbister, 707 P.2d at 218. 
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Finding the Unruh Civil Rights Act violated by the 
refusal of the Peninsula Golf and Country Club to issue 
family memberships to women, the California Court of Appeals 
rejected the argument that the definition of "business 
establishment" should be decided on the basis of a 
public\private dichotomy: "The core question whether 
defendant is a xbusiness establishment' within the meaning 
of the Act does not lend itself to a formula-like solution 
under the more traditional public:private classification 
scheme," Peninsula Golf, 262 Cal.Rptr. at 893. Although 
the Peninsula Club "consistently argued that its membership 
is selective and restricted," the Court noted that plaintiff 
alleged that the Club's facilities "are open to the public, 
at least in the form of guest use and rental." ]Cd. at 
896.10 The Court concluded that the "crucially important 
issues of degree of exclusivity maintained and the nature of 
10
 Because Peninsula Golf concerned whether plaintiff 
had alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for 
violation of the Unruh Act, the Court was not in a position 
to rule on the merits of the case. Id. at 896. The Court 
did decide, on the basis of the pleadings, that the Unruh 
Act could prohibit the Golf Club's discriminatory membership 
practices and remanded for a determination of whether 
enforcement of the Act would unduly burden the Club's 
associational rights. Id. at 895 (citations omitted) ("the 
right to associational privacy is not without qualification 
and is subject to a balancing process"). Importantly, the 
Court did not consider the selectiveness of the club to 
determine that the Club was a business establishment, but 
instead reserved these issues for the discussion of intimate 
associational rights. Id. 
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the intimate or expressive associational rights involved" 
could not be decided on the initial pleadings. Id. 
As these cases demonstrate, the Lodge'& status as a 
private, non-profit corporation does not insulate it from 
the reach of Utah's civil rights act. Private, non-profit 
clubs have been subject to the reach of state civil rights 
legislation, supra, Title II litigation, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
2000a(b)(3), (c)(3); for example, United States v. Lansdowne 
Swim Club, 713 F.Supp. 735 (E.D.Pa. 1989) (although 
membership dependant upon approval of a committee and 
various criteria, swim club not a private club exempted 
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(e)), while non-profit, charities 
are subject to Title VII which covers only industries 
affecting commerce. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(h); for example, 
Martin v. United Way of Erie County, 829 F.2d 445 (3rd Cir. 
1987) (local, non-profit charitable organization). 
Given the criteria established by case law and 
considerations of legislative purpose and intent, the Lodge 
is a business establishment. First, as argued above, the 
Lodge is a regulated enterprise simply because it has state 
licenses to sell beer and liquor. Second, as a non-profit 
corporation, the Lodge shares identical powers with a Utah 
for-profit business corporation, including those necessary 
to "transact its business." U.C.A. § 16-6-22(10) (1953 as 
amended); compare U.C.A. § 16-10a-302 (1953 as amended) 
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(general powers of business corporations), attached as 
exhibit "C" and "D" respectively. Only the manner in which 
the two entities may distribute their profits separate a 
non-profit from a for-profit corporation. Non-profits are 
not precluded from making profits, only from distributing 
the profits to members or officers. U.C.A. § 16-6-19 (11) 
(1953 as amended). This structural difference is not 
sufficient to insulate non-profit corporations from the 
reach of anti-discrimination legislation. Third, the 
Lodge7s relationship with its members and their guests 
closely resembles a traditional business relationship — 
that of proprietor\client — which is common to all eating 
and drinking establishments in St. George. Again, no 
aspects of this relationship are particular to the Lodge in 
a manner that would justify allowing discrimination at the 
Lodge but not at a similar facility down the street. 
In addition to being unable to hide behind its non-
profit status, the Lodge cannot avoid the reach of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act simply because it is a "private" club. 
First, the Lodge has relinquished its private status by 
applying for and accepting state licenses to sell beer and 
liquor. Second, relevant civil rights law readily confirms 
that although an entity presents itself as private, it 
remains a "business establishment" subject to state anti-
discrimination law. Third, even in public accommodations 
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law — applying civil rights statutes to the more restricted 
"places of public accommodation" rather than the broader 
"business establishment" — private organizations and clubs, 
such as the Lodge, which may limit access to their 
facilities and maintain selective membership criteria, have 
been prohibited, again and again, from denying access to 
their facilities on discriminatory classifications. For all 
these reasons, the Lodge is subject to Utah's Civil Rights 
Act.11 
C. The Elks Lodge Cannot Claim Free Association Immunity 
From the Utah Civil Rights Act. 
Freedom of association is not without qualifications. 
Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984); Rotary Club, 
481 U.S. 537 (1987). Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has refused to extend constitutional protection to the 
associations among members of the Rotary Club and the 
Jaycees, both private membership organizations similar to 
the Lodge. Id. In both cases, the Clubs lacked intimacy 
11
 The Lodge argues — quite falsely — that if it is 
included under the scope of the Utah Civil Rights Act, "even 
churches would qualify as xbusiness establishments7 . . . . 
givfing] the Attorney General power to regulate churches and 
to select their members and their clergy." Appellee's Brief 
at 23. The Utah Act specifically states that "[n]othing in 
this act shall be construed . . . to deny any religious 
organization the right to regulate the operation and 
procedures of its establishments." U.C.A. § 13-7-3 (1953 as 
amended). 
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sufficient to provide them the privacy protection afforded 
to family-like relationships. As does the Lodge, both Clubs 
founded their First Amendment claims on assertions that they 
maintained selective membership criteria. The Supreme Court 
twice rejected this defense. 
Similarly, the Lodge has failed to demonstrate that the 
relationship among its members is sufficiently intimate to 
warrant associational protections. The Lodge cannot avoid 
legal constraints on discrimination simply by having 
selective membership criteria. The relevant inquiry focuses 
instead upon the smallness, the genuine selectivity and the 
seclusion of the Club. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. The Lodge 
lacks all of these traits. First, the Lodge has waived its 
claims of private association by consenting to the 
regulation of the state in return for the right to sell beer 
and liquor. Second, because it admits as members almost all 
— if not all — male applicants, the Lodge is not genuinely 
selective. Appellant's Brief at 35-37. Third, the Club is 
neither small (more than 6% of Washington County males are 
members), nor are its activities cloistered. Id. Because 
the Lodge is insufficiently private to warrant special 
constitutional protection, it cannot distinguish Roberts v. 
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Jaycees or Rotary Club and cannot claim to be uniquely 
exempt from anti-discrimination law.12 
BRIEF OP ATTORNEY GENERAL 
In 1987, when the case of Megan Marie Peters v. ALTA 
CLUB, a non-profit Utah corporation. Case No. 86-0406 was 
pending before this Court, the then Utah Attorney General, 
David L. Wilkinson, as a statutory party under U.C.A. § 78-
33-11 (1953 as amended) filed a brief dealing with the Utah 
Civil Rights Act and its application to the Alta Club. That 
brief is part of the Trial Record in this case, filed on 
February 22, 1988 in the predecessor case and incorporated 
in to this case. T.R. p. 1028. 
12
 Oddly, the Lodge attempts to distinguish Roberts v. 
Jaycees, supra., from the case at bar, suggesting that only 
because the Jaycees were a "place of public ciccommodation" 
(not a "business establishment") did the state have a com-
pelling interest in prohibiting the Club/s discriminatory 
conduct. Appellee's Brief at 39. Obviously, the state of 
Utah has the same compelling interest in regulating the 
conduct of a "business establishment" as the state of 
Minnesota has in regulating a "place of public accommoda-
tion." Only if an entity is sufficiently private, can its 
privacy interest outweigh this compelling interest. The 
Jaycees and the Lodge both failed to establish a sufficient-
ly intimate association among their members to warrant this 
protection. 
22 
Because that brief is well researched and written and 
provides a valuable exposition from the Attorney General as 
to the history and application of the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
a complete copy of that brief is appended to this brief as 
Exhibit "P". 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's Civil Rights Act finds "nourishing validity" in 
Article IV, § 1 of this State's Constitution. This 
provision, an element of Utah's Constitution since 
statehood, declares: "Both male and female citizens of this 
State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious 
rights and privileges." Utah Const. Art. IV, § 1. Coupled 
with the explicit mandate of the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
"[t]his clear and comprehensive statement in our 
foundational law correlates with the purpose that there 
shall be no discrimination based on sex." Kopp v. Salt Lake 
City, 506 P.2d 809, 809-810 (Utah 1973). Indeed, comparing 
this constitutional mandate to the freedom of contract, the 
Utah Supreme Court insisted that "Art. I, Sec. 1 must 
prevail as the more precious right in our basic law. All 
fundamental rights — including obligation of contract — 
remain, we believe, in peril or unfulfillment when invidious 
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discrimination is permitted by law . . . ." Beehive Med, 
Electronics v. Industrial Commission, 583 P.2d 53, 60 (Utah 
1978). 
Accordingly, the Lodge cannot be insulated from the 
reach of the constitutional and legislative requirement that 
individuals and society be free from the affront and 
humiliation of gender discrimination. Justice and fairness 
dictate that the Lodge comply with Utah's anti-
discrimination mandate while it enjoys the special privilege 
of state licenses. The Lodge is prohibited from 
discriminating against Ms. Beynon because of its state 
licenses to sell beer and liquor. Further, because it 
exhibits business-like qualities and conducts its affairs 
openly, the Lodge is a business establishment for the 
purposes of the act. Finally, by accepting state licenses 
to sell beer and alcohol, by not genuinely restricting its 
membership and by conducting its business publicly, the 
Lodge has waived any right First Amendment protection. 
For these reasons, this Court should reverse the ruling 
and decision of the trial court, determine that the Utah 
Civil Rights Act applies to the Lodge and remand this case 
with instructions to the trial court to entei: judgment in 
24 
favor of Ms. Beynon granting declaratory and injunctive 
relief to end the illegal gender discrimination practiced by 
the Lodge. 
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BRIEF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Statutory Party 
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16-6-22. General powers-
Each nonprofit corporation shall have power: 
(1) To have perpetual succession by its corporate name unless a limited 
period of duration is stated in its articles of incorporation. 
(2) To sue and be sued, complain and defend, in its corporate name. 
(3) To have a corporate seal which may be altered at pleasure, and to 
use the same by causing, it, or a facsimile thereof, to be impressed or 
(4) To purchase, take, receive, lease," take by gift, devise or bequest, or 
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, use and otherwise deal in and with 
real or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated. 
(5) To sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, transfer and 
otherwise dispose of all or any part of its property and assets. 
(6) To lend money to its employees other than its officers and trustees. 
(7) To purchase, take, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, 
hold, vote, use, employ, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose 
of, and otherwise use and deal in and with, shares or other interests in, or 
obligations of, other domestic or foreign corporations, whether for profit 
or not for profit, associations, partnerships or individuals, or direct or 
indirect obligations of the United States, or of any other government, 
state, territory, governmental district or municipality or of any instru-
mentality thereof. 
(8) To make contracts and incur liabilities, borrow money at such rates 
of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its notes, bonds, and 
other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge 
of all or any of its property, franchises and income. 
(9) To lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its 
funds, and take and hold real and personal property as security for the 
payment of funds so loaned or invested. 
(10) To conduct its affairs, transact its business, carry on its operations, 
and have offices and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state, 
territory, district, or possession of the United States, or in any foreign 
country. 
(11) To elect or appoint officers and agents of the corporation, and 
define their duties and fix their compensation. 
(12) To make and alter bylaws, or resolutions, not inconsistent with its 
articles of incorporation or with the laws of this state, for the administra-
tion and regulation of the affairs of the corporation. 
(13) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorporation, to make 
donations for the public welfare or for religious, charitable, scientific or 
educational purposes; and in time of war to make donations in aid of war 
activities. 
(14) To indemnify any trustee or officer or former trustee or officer of 
the corporation, or any person who may have served at its request as a 
trustee, director or officer of another corporation, whether for profit or not 
for profit, against expenses actually and necessarily incurred by him in 
connection with the defense of any action, suit or proceeding in which he 
is made a party by reason of being or having been such trustee, director or 
officer, except in relation to matters as to which he shall be adjudged in 
such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or misconduct in 
the performance of duty; but such indemnification shall not be deemed 
exclusive of any other rights to which such trustee, director or officer may 
be entitled, under any bylaw, agreement, vote of the governing board or 
members or otherwise. 
16-10a-302. General powers. 
Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, and except as re-
stricted by the Utah Constitution, every corporation has perpetual duration 
and succession in its corporate name and has the same powers as an individ-
ual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its permitted business 
purposes, activities, and affairs, including without limitation the power: 
. (1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend in its corporate name; 
(2) to have a corporate seal, which may be altered at will, and to use it, 
or a facsimile of it, by impressing or affixing it or in any other manner 
reproducing.it; 
(3) to make and amend bylaws, not inconsistent with its articles of 
incorporation or with the laws of this state, for managing the business 
and regulating the affairs of the corporation; 
(4) to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise acquire, and own, hold, 
improve, use, and otherwise deal with, real or personal property, or any 
legal or equitable interest in property, wherever located; 
(5) to sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, lease, exchange, and otherwise 
dispose of all or-any part of its property and assets; 
(6) to purchase, receive, subscribe for, or otherwise acquire, own, hold, 
vote, use, sell, mortgage, lend, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, and deal in 
and with shares or other interests in, or obligations of, any other entity; 
(7) to make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow money, 
issue its notes, bonds, and other obligations that may or may not be 
convertible into or include the option to purchase other securities of the 
corporation, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage or pledge of 
any of its property, assets, franchises, or income; 
(8) to lend money, invest and reinvest its funds, and receive and hold 
real and personal property as security for repayment; 
(9) to be a promoter, partner, member, associate, or manager of any 
partnership, joint venture, trust, or other entity; 
• (10) to conduct its business, locate offices, and exercise the powers 
granted by this chapter within or without this state; 
(11) to elect directors and appoint officers, employees, and agents of the 
corporation, define their duties, fix their compensation, and lend them 
money and credit; 
(12) to pay pensions and establish pension plans, pension trusts, profit 
sharing plans, share bonus plans, share option plans, and benefit or in-
centive plans for any or all of its current or former directors, officers, 
employees, and agents; 
(13) to make donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scien-
tific, or educational purposes; 
(14) to transact any lawful business that will aid governmental policy; 
(15) to make payments or donations, or do any other act, not inconsis-
tent with law, that furthers the business and affairs of the corporation; 
and 
(16) to establish rules governing the conduct of the business and affairs 
of the corporation in the event of an emergency. 
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-302, enacted by Cross-References. — Constitutional provi-
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 33. sions relating to corporations, Utah Const., 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 277, Art. XII. 
§ 249 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
(15) To voluntarily dissolve 2ind distribute its assets in accordance with 
the provisions of this act. 
(16) To have and exercise all powers necessary or convenient to effect 
any or all of the purposes for which the corporation is organized, includ-
ing the right to raise funds by such means or methods as the governing 
board may deem advisable, not inconsistent with*law or its articles-of 
incorporation or bylaws. 
History: L. 1963, chu 17, § 5. 
Meaning of "this act." — See the note un-
der the same catchline following § 16-6-20. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MEGAN MARIE PETERS, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : BRIEF OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 
vs. : 
ALTA CLUB, a non-profit Utah : No. 860406 
corporation, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Is the Alta Club subject to the Utah Civil 
Rights Act as an "enterprise regulated by the 
State?" 
II. Does enforcement of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
against the Alta Club violate its members' right 
of free association as guaranteed by the United 
States and Utah Constitutions? 
III. Is the term "all places of business which sell 
beer to consumers" unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad? 
STATUTES REQUIRING CONSTRUCTION 
The following provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986) are at issue: 
13-7-1. Policy and purposes of act. 
It is hereby declared that the practice 
of discrimination on the basis of race, 
color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national 
origin in business establishments or places 
of public accommodation or in enterprises 
regulated by the state endangers the health, 
safety, and general welfare of this state and 
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination 
in business establishments or places of 
public accommodation or in enterprises 
regulated by the state, violates the public 
policy of the state. It is the purpose of 
this act to assure all citizens full and 
equal availability of all goods, services and 
facilities offered by business establishments 
and places of public accommodation and 
enterprises regulated by the state without 
discrimination because of race, color, sexr 
religion, ancestry or national origin. The 
rules of common law that statues in 
derogation thereof shall be strictly 
construed has no application to this act. 
This act shall be liberally construed with a 
view to promote the policy and purposes of 
the act and to promote justice. The remedies 
provided herein shall not be exclusive but 
shall be in addition to any other remedies 
available at law or equity. 
13-7-2. Definitions. 
(a) The term "place of public 
accommodation11 includes every place, 
establishment, or facility of whatever kind, 
nature, or class that caters or offers its 
services, facilities, or goods to the general 
public for a fee or charge, except, any 
establishment located within a building which 
contains not more than five rooms for rent or 
hire and which is actually occupied by the 
proprietor of such establishment as his 
residence; provided that any place, 
establishment, or facility that caters or 
offers its services, facilities, or goods to 
the general public gratuitously shall be 
within the definition of this term if it 
receives any substantial governmental subsidy 
or support; but the term shall not apply to 
any institution, church, any apartment house, 
club, or place of accommodation which is in 
its nature distinctly private except to the 
extent that it is open to the public. 
(b) The term "person" includes one or 
more individuals, partnerships, associations, 
organizations, corporations, labor unions, 
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in 
bankruptcy, receivers, and other organized 
groups of persons. 
(c) "Enterprises regulated by the state" 
means: 
(1) all institutions subject to 
regulation under the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Credit Code, Title 70B; 
(2) all places of business which 
sell beer to consumers or house a state 
liquor store, as permitted by the Liquor 
Control Act, Title 32; 
(3) all insurers regulated by the 
Insurance Code, Title 31A; 
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(4) all public utilities subject to 
regulation under the Public Utilities Act, 
Title 54. 
13-7-3. Equal right in business establish-
ments, places of public accommodation, and 
enterprises regulated by the state. 
All persons within the jurisdiction of 
this state are free and equal and are 
entitled to full and equal accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and 
services in all business establishments and 
in all places of public accommodation, and 
by all enterprises regulated by the state of 
every kind whatsoever, without discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, 
ancestry or national origin. Nothing in this 
act shall be construed to deny any person the 
right to regulate the operation of a business 
establishment or place of public accommoda-
tion or an enterprise regulated by the state 
in a manner which applies uniformly to all 
persons without regard to race, color, sex, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin; or to 
deny any religious organization the right to 
regulate the operation and procedures of its 
establishments. 
13-7-4. Business establishment, place of 
public accommodation, or enterprise regulated 
by the state denying rights deemed public 
nuisance - Investigation and conciliation -
Action to enjoin - Civil action for damages -
Expenses of defending action. 
Any business establishment or place of 
public accommodation or enterprise regulated 
by the state in which a violation of the 
rights provided in § 13-7-3 of this act 
occurs is a public nuisance. The operator of 
any such business establishment or place of 
public accommodation or enterprise regulated 
by the state shall be deemed guilty of 
maintaining a public nuisance and may be 
enjoined as hereinafter provided. 
(a) Upon application to the attorney 
general by any person denied the rights 
guaranteed by S 13-7-3, the attorney general 
shall investigate and seek to conciliate the 
matter. 
(b) An action to enjoin any nuisance 
defined in this section may be brought in the 
name of the state of Utah by the attorney 
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general. Upon the trial of the cause, on 
finding that the material allegations of the 
complaint are true, the court shall order 
such nuisance to be abated, and enjoin all 
persons from maintaining or permitting such 
nuisance. When any injunction as herein 
provided has been granted it shall be binding 
upon the defendant and shall act as an 
injunction in personam against the defendant 
throughout the state. 
(c) Any person who is denied the rights 
provided for in § 13-7-3 shall have a civil 
action for damages and any other remedy 
available in law or equity against any person 
who denies him the rights provided for in § 
13-7-3 or who aids, incites or conspires to 
bring about such denial. 
(d) Any business establishment or place 
of public accommodation or enterprises 
regulated by the state charged with 
maintaining a public nuisance in violation of 
this act, which is determined or found not to 
be in violation of this act, may be awarded 
all actual and necessary expenses incurred in 
defending such action, as determined and 
approved by the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Peters filed suit in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County charging appellant Alta Club 
with sexual discrimination in violation of her civil rights based 
upon the Club's refusal to tender her a membership application. 
Judgment was entered against Alta Club to the effect that the 
Alta Club must issue to Peters a membership application and 
reasonably and diligently consider her application; or 
alternatively, stop the sale of beer on the premises. 
Alta Club appeals from the Judgment entered June 16, 
1986 in this case. Peters cross-appeals from an Order entered 
February 14, 1986, denying her motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to the Memorandum Decision entered February 4, 1986. 
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The Attorney General appears in this Court to support 
the constitutionality of the Utah Civil Rights Act and appears 
essentially in the nature of an amicus curiae to support the 
position taken by Peters, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-33-11 
(1953), which permits the Attorney General to be heard in any 
proceeding in which a state statute is alleged to be invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Attorney General accepts the fact statements 
summarized in Appellant's brief and supplemented by 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Alta Club is an enterprise regulated by the state 
and is subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act by virtue of its sale 
of beer and liquor to members and their guests. Utah Legislators 
specifically discussed the meaning and application of the term 
"enterprises regulated by the state" and concluded that this 
phrase would apply to the Alta Club. Legislative history behind 
the new liquor laws reveals that the state liquor store concept 
was retained under the new licensing system based upon a Utah 
Supreme Court ruling that there was no legal distinction between 
a club license and a state liquor store. 
Utah Legislators have determined that gender 
discrimination endangers the health, safety and welfare of the 
state and its inhabitants. Under principle rules of construction 
the Court may take notice of governmental studies revealing that 
between 1984 and 1985 forty percent of Utah's female population 
were employed in managerial and professional occupations, yet 
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earned only sixty percent of male counterpart earnings. Areas 
targeted by governmental studies as barriers to full 
participation of women in the work force specifically included 
private non-profit organizations and societal beliefs that 
discourage career aspirations. 
The Alta Club does not operate its organization as an 
extension of the home and is not entitled to the constitutional 
protections afforded to private social relationships. The Alta 
Club was formed to provide a place and means for conducting 
business meetings and women may attend such meetings. 
Furthermore, any claim to associtional freedom by Alta Club is 
outweighed by Utah's compelling interest in the dignity of her 
citizens and the politicalf economic and social gains of an 
integrated work force. 
Utah lawmakers may act with broad authority in creating 
rights of access on behalf of her citizens.* The state has 
determined that enterprises regulated by the state must not' 
discriminate on the basis of sex and has defined that phrase to 
include all places of business which sell beer to consumers. The 
Alta Club describes itself as a place of business in its Articles 
of Incorporation and By-Laws. Thereforef the Alta Club must 
comply with the Utah Civil Rights Act, or stop the sale of 
alcoholic beverages on its premises. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 
SUPPORTS A RULING THAT THE ALTA CLUB 
IS "AN ENTERPRISE REGULATED BY THE 
STATE." 
A. LEGISLATORS HAVE PROGRESSIVELY 
BROADENED THE SCOPE OF THE UTAH 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT. 
Recognizing that discrimination is contrary to the best 
interest of the community, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah 
Civil Rights Act (hereinafter "Act") in 1965 to prohibit 
discriminatory conduct on the basis of race, color, religion, 
ancestry, or national origin in business establishments or places 
of public accommodation, 1965 Utah Laws 174 (H.B. No. 311, 
current version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986)). Like 
many other states, Utah has progessively broadened the scope of 
its anti-discrimination law in the years since it was first 
enacted with respect to the type of covered facilities and the 
entities for whom discrimination is forbidden. 
In 1973 the Act was amended for the express purposes of 
"Defining and Extending the Application of the Act to Enterprises 
Regulated by the State; and Extending the Application of the Act 
to Prevent Discrimination on the Basis of Sex." 1973 Utah Laws 
18 (current version at Utah Code Ann. S§ 13-7-1 to -4 (1986)). 
In construing the phrase "enterprises regulated by the 
state," the court may look to statements made by individual 
members of the Legislature. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 259-260 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 
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1032 (1967; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 342 (1945); 2A 
C. Sands, Sutherland on Statutory Constr. S48.13 (4th Ed. 1984). 
Discussion was had during the 1973 senate floor debates 
specifically regarding the meaning of the phrase "enterprises 
regulated by the state"* 
Senator Howe: Mr. President, I was just 
calling Representative Urie to see if she 
wanted to come over and explain it [H.B. No. 
311] -- but, I think it's rather self-
explanatory. The purpose of it is, I think, 
to put into our law, a prohibition against 
discrimination on account of sex. We already 
have it on — that we can't discriminate on 
the basis of race, color, religion, ancestry, 
national origin; but it was not -
discrimination on the basis of sex was not 
included, in this written law, which was 
passed in 1965. This is the law, the 
antidiscrimination law really of 1965. Then 
I note also that it includes not only places 
of public accommodation but in enterprises 
regulated by the state. Now I'm not just 
sure, frankly, what that means, "enterprises 
regulated by the state," but I suppose that 
it would be — 
Senate President: It's - the explanation is 
on the next page, Senator Howe. 
Senator Howe: Oh. 
Senate President: Line 19. [Pause] Just 
about everybody . . . 
Senator Howe: That's right. In other words, 
it just, applies, prohibits discrimination 
generally against women. We're not doing — 
discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't 
hurt anybody. 
Senate President: I'm, I'm not sure about 
one thing — can you tell me for sure — 
Senator Howe: About what? 
Senate President: I almost hate to mention 
it — but, the only place I know of, is the 
Alta Club that has a separate entrance for 
women — 
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[laughter] 
Senator Howe: This, this may change that — 
Discrimination on Basis of Sex: Hearing on H.B. No. 311f 40th 
Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh, 
President, and Sen. Richard C. Howe) (App. B). Thus it appears 
that Utah Legislators contemplated the entities for whom 
discrimination is forbidden and concluded that the Alta Club is 
an "enterprise" within the meaning of the Act. 
B. UTAH LIQUOR LAWS SUPPORT A RULING 
THAT THE ALTA CLUB IS "AN ENTERPRISE 
REGULATED BY THE STATE." 
The language of the Utah Civil Rights Act defines 
"enterprises regulated by the state" to include: 
(1) All institutions subject to regulation 
under the Utah Uniform Commercial Credit 
Code, Title 70B, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
(2) All places of business which sell beer 
to consumers or house a state liquor store, 
as permitted by the liquor control act, Title 
32, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
(3) All insurers regulated by the insurance 
code, Title 31, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
(4) All public utilities subject to 
regulation under the public utilities act, 
Title 54, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
1973 Utah Laws 18 (current version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-7-1 
to -4 (1986)). Title 32, the former Liquor Control Act referred 
to in the Utah Civil Rights Act, was repealed on February 25, 
1985, and was replaced by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 
title 32A, Utah Code Ann. (1986). 1985 Utah Laws 175. On the 
same day, the Utah Civil Rights Act was amended with only minor 
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changes1 retaining substantially the language introduced in 1973. 
At the time the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was 
considered, memorandum attached to the proposed legislation and 
sent to the Utah State Legislature from the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, the original author of the bill, stated that, "It]he 
commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to 
preserve, whenever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's 
present liquor laws • • . [making] substantive change . . . most 
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law 
would be enhanced." Memorandum No. 1 from Utah Liquor Commission 
to Utah State Legislature at 9-10 (App. C)• 
One of the changes in the proposed legislation which 
was adopted was the elimination of the term "state liquor stores" 
in favor of regulating sales outlets under a single license. Id. 
at 12. The Liquor Commission explained that the state store 
concept originated with the purpose of allowing a degree of 
contol over businesses, including removal of the state's liquor 
outlet where necessary. Id. at 10. The Commission noted it had 
previously attempted to summarily remove "'its'" state store from 
a licensee's premises, but that the Utah Supreme Court had 
rejected any legal distinction between the license issued to the 
club and the leasing of space within the club, thereby entitling 
the club to procedural due process. Id. at 11 (citing Celebrity 
Club, Inc., v. ULCC, 657 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1982)). For that 
1
 The 1985 amendment deleted "Utah Code Annotated 1953" from §§ 
13-7-2, c(l), (2) and 4; and substituted "Title 31A" for "Title 
31, Utah Code Annotated 1953" at the end of § 13-7-2(c)(3). 
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reason, and for the elimination of administrative burdens, Mn]o 
leases are required under [the new liquor laws]." id. at 12 The 
Commission was quick to assure legislators that fundamental 
concepts and operations would not change, and "the state has 
really not lost any real degree of actual control over the 
outlet." Xd. In short, the Alta Club continues to be an entity 
that "house Is] a state liquor store." Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-2(c) 
(1986) . 
During revision of the former liquor laws, no mention 
was made that the new Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was intended 
to modify the Utah Civil Rights Act to exclude private clubs 
which are licensed to sell liquor. Nor was there any alteration 
in the manner in which retail beer sales were to be handled. 
Memorandum No. 2 from Utah Liquor Commission to Utah State 
Legislature at 15 (App. D). 
There is no indication that Legislators intended to 
narrowly define the phrase "all places of business which sell 
beer to consumers." The language of the Utah Civil Rights Act 
supports a broad construction. Utah Legislators expressly 
provided that the Act "shall be liberally construed with a view 
to promote the policy and purposes of the act and to promote 
justice." Utah Code Ann. §13-7-1 (1986). In light of the 
liberal interpretation to be given the Act, and the absence of a 
clear expression that private clubs licensed to sell liquor are 
not to be included as an enterprise regulated by the state, the 
statute should be construed to apply to the Alta Club based upon 
its retail sale of beer and liquor. 
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C. COMMUNITY CIRCUMSTANCES CHAMPION 
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS 
TO THE ALTA CLUB. 
In addition to legislative history, community 
circumstances support a ruling that the Alta Club was intended to 
be subject to the Utah Civil Rights Act. "[L]aws are not 
abstract propositions. They are expressions of policy arising 
out of specific situations and addressed to the attainment of 
particular ends." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading 
of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 528, 533 (1947). A principle rule 
of construction is that courts may take notice of pertinent 
social facts. Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation, 3A Sutherland 
Stat. Constr. 165 (4th Ed. 1986). According to section 13-7-1 
Utah Legislators were concerned that discrimination on the basis 
of sex "endanger led] the health, safety, and general welfare of 
this state and its inhabitants; and . . . violates . . . public 
policy." Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (1986). The Act was passed 
with the purpose of assuring to "all citizens full and equal 
availability of all goods, services and facilities offered by 
business establishments and places of public accommodation and 
enterprises regulated by the state." Utah Code Ann. §13-7-1 
(1986) (emphasis added) . 
An intensive study performed at Governor Matheson's 
request less than one year before the last amendment to the Utah 
Civil Rights Act revealed: 
Institutional structures, founded on 
stereotyping, deprive women of achieving 
economic independence and deprive the work 
place of their potential contribution. 
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Governorfs Task Force on Integrating Women Into the Workforce, 
Utah Women in Economic Crisis, at 2 (June 1984) (Archives # 
P840081)(App. E). The task force targeted several areas for 
solutions to the multiple barriers which impede full 
participation of women in the work force including the need to: 
(1) strengthen social experience in private non-profit 
organizations that would facilitate career mobility; (2) increase 
public awareness of successful performance; (3) change laws, 
policies and practices that directly or indirectly discriminate 
against women; (4) strengthen networks in professional 
associations and private non-profit organizations; and (4) 
eliminate societal beliefs that discourage career aspirations, 
id. at 20-23. 
Utah lawmakers are legitimately concerned about the 
effect of discrimination on the state and its citizens. 
Legislative history and circumstances support a construction that 
the Alta Club falls within the categories of enterprises 
regulated by the Act. In enacting the Utah Civil Rights Actf 
lawmakers have not unlawfully intruded upon the traditional 
"hands-off" policy surrounding the private sphere. They have 
merely said that where an enterprise elects to sell alcoholic 
beverages, it thereby becomes subject to state regulation, and 
must comply with requirements prohibiting discrimination. The 
Alta Club is an "enterprise regulated by the state" as defined in 
section 13-7-2 (c)(2) because of the fact that it sells beer and 
liquor to its patrons (R. 43, 257). 
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POINT II 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
TO ASSOCIATIONAL FREEDOM ARE NOT VIOLATED BY 
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT TO 
THE ALTA CLUB. 
A. THE UTAH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT IS A REASONABLE 
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION. 
Congress sought to prohibit discriminatory conduct 
privately-owned facilities open to the public through passage 
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000a 
(West Supp. 1976) (hereinafter "Federal Act"). The state act 
requirement that limited federal powers to regulate private 
conduct under the fourteenth amendment was circumvented by 
Congress on the theory that the Act represented regulation of 
interstate commerce. The Federal Act states in part: 
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages and 
accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation, as defined in this'section, 
without discrimination or segregation on the 
grounds of race, color, religion, or national 
origin. 
(e) The provisions of this subchapter shall 
not apply to a private club or other 
establishment not in fact open to the public, 
except to the extent that the facilities of 
such establishment are made available to the 
customers or patrons of an establishment 
within the scope of subsection (b) of this 
section. 
42 U.S.C.A. S2000a (West Supp. 1976). Although the federal 
government did not feel compelled to address gender 
discrimination, Congress did not preempt state and local 
communities to act on their own initiative. 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains several 
provisions which refer expressly to the 
powers of the states in the field of civil 
rights* Some of these provisions require 
federal action to be deferred in favor of 
action under any state statute which may be 
equally effective in enforcing the policies 
which Congress incorporated into the act. 
Other provisions define circumstances under 
which state or local agencies may be utilized 
in cooperation with the federal government to 
carry out the functions defined in the act. 
Finally the act contains certain provisions 
which, rather than grant power to the states, 
recognized the residual powers of a state to 
enact its own civil rights legislation and 
allow full faith and credit to those acts not 
inconsistent with the federal legislation. 
Comment, State Legislative Response to the Federal Civil Rights 
Act, 9 Utah L. Rev. 434, 439 (1964). 
States have responded to the courteous yielding by the 
federal government with a myriad of solutions to discriminatory 
conduct. Host state legislatures have patterned sex 
discrimination statutes after the federal public accommodations 
law, thereby including explicitly or implicitly a private club 
exemption as found in the Federal Act.2 Burns, The Exclusion of 
Women from Influential Men's Clubs, 18 Harv. C. R. - C.L. L. Rev. 
321, 377 (1983) (hereinafter, "Exclusion of Women"). But there 
are also significant differences in state statutes from the 
Federal Act, and differences among individual states. 
2
 Alta Club relies upon Wright v. Salisbury Club, 479 F. Supp. 
378 (D.C. Va. 1979), rev'd, 632 F.2d 309 (1980) to support the 
position that nonprofit clubs are exempt under federal and state 
legislation. APPELLANT BRIEF at 19. However, Salisbury Club was 
reversed on the grounds that the club in question was not "truly 
private." 479 F. Supp. 378 (D.C. Va. 1979), revfd 632 F.2d 309 
(1980) . 
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Of those states electing to include gender as a class 
to be protected under state civil rights laws, ten statutes do 
not include a specific private club exemption.3 Among states 
including private club exemptions, a number include restrictions 
that, in the absence of compliance, may trigger application of 
state civil rights laws to the private club: Idaho Code § 18-
7302 (Burns 1948) ("where public use is permitted that use shall 
be covered by this section"); Iowa Code Ann. S601A.2M0) (West 
1974 and Supp. 1986) ("except when such distinctly private place, 
establishment, or facility caters or offers services, facilities, 
or goods to the nonmembers for a fee or charge or gratuitously, 
it shall be deemed a public accommodation during such period"); 
•Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1018 (1986) ("unless membership in such 
religion is restricted on account of race, color, national origin 
or ancestry"); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §5 (1957) (except to the 
extent the club principally engages in selling food or alcoholic 
beverages; but not to facilities "designed to accommodate only a 
particular sex"); Mich. Stat. Ann. §3.548(303) (Callaghan 1985 & 
Supp. 1986) ("except to the extent that the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations . . . are 
made available to the customers or patrons of another 
3
 Alaska Stat. § 18.80.230 (1986) (subsequently interpreted to 
include a "private club" exemption even though no express 
language to that effect was included in the statute. United 
States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983)). Colo. 
Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46-64 (1958); 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 4503 (1953 & Supp. 1986); Ind. Code Ann. 
S 22-9-1-2 (1986); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 §§ 4552, 4591 
(1967); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 272 § 92A (West 1932); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. § 363.03 (1969); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-1-102 (1985); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-14-04 (1985). 
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establishment that is a place of public accommodation or is 
licensed by the state under Act No. 8 of the Public Acts of 
1933*); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20-107 (1983) (liquor license revoked 
upon discrimination against "any person who is a guest of a 
member of such club"); N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §40 (McKinney 1976 & 
Supp. 1987) (club forfeits distinctively private status upon 
sponsoring or conducting an athletic contest, advertisement of a 
contest or exhibition as a state affair, or utilizes the words 
"'New York State1" in its announcement); Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§942.04(2), (3) (1981 & Supp. 1986) (upon rental of private 
facilities to the public). 
Finally, California statutes provide that only certain 
types of clubs are exempt from anti-discrimination laws. 
California lawmakers have fashioned thirty-one separate 
definitions of "club." Cal. Club Licenses Code §§ 23425-23429 
(West 1984). Six of the possible thirty-one organizations are 
prohibited from discriminating, distinguishing or restricting any 
person on account of gender. 
All states now have some form of legislation banning 
discrimination in regards to use the of facilities, services or 
accommodations, but the proliferation of legislation contains 
much diversity in regard to particulars. States have expanded 
proscriptions to apply to such activities as employment, labor 
organizations, training programs and access to a profession or 
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vocation.* Some states have special provisions outlawing 
discrimination in regard to wages.5 Other anti-discrimination 
provisions apply to housing, sale or lease of property and 
4 Alaska Stat. §18.80.200(b), 295 (1962); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§20-
314a, 53-53a (1958); D.C. Code Ann. §1-2512 (1981), Fla. Stat. 
Ann. §454.18 (West 1965); Idaho Code §18-7301 (1949); Ind. Code 
Ann. §22-9-1-2 (Burns 1986); Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-1001 (1986); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. §§344.050, .360, .070, .375 (1983 & Supp. 1986); La. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §37:2715 (West 1950); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 5 
§613.330 (1967); Minn. Stat. §155.11 (1969); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20-
109 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. §613.330 (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§278:3 (1966); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25 §§1303, 1305-06 (1986); 
Or. Rev. Stat. §659.030 (1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §955 
(Purdon 1930); R.I. Gen. Laws §28-5-7 (1956); S.D. Codified Laws 
Ann. §§16-16-14, 20-13-11 (1967); Vt. Stats. Ann. tit. 21, §§495-
495c (1939); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§49.04.100 to .130, 49.60.200 
(1961); W. Va. Code §5-11-9 (1984); Wis. Stat. Ann. §256.28 (1981 
& Supp. 1986). 
5
 Ark. Stat. Ann. §81-624 (1960); Cal. Labor Code §1197.5 (West 
1971); Colo. Rev. Stat. §8-5-102 (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
S§31-75, 31-76 (1958); Ga. Code Ann. §34-5-1 (1981); Hawaii Rev. 
Stat. §387-4 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. §§44-1701 to 44-1704 (1948); 
Ky. Rev. Stat. §§337.420 (1971); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §§55A 
to H (1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 149 §§105A to 105C (West 
1932); Mo. Ann. Rev. Stat. §290.400 (1959); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
§§652.210 (1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §336.3 (Purdon 1930); 
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §28-6-18 (1956). 
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utility services.^ Still others apply to insurance companies, 
credit and lending institutions, brokers and salespeople.7 Utah 
Legislators have done no more than other states making 
legislative choices as to what entities should appropriately fall 
within anti-discrimination laws. 
6
 Alaska Stat. §§18.80.130, 18.80.200, .240 (1962); Cal. Civ. 
Code §53 (West 1954); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24-34-405 (1973); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§8-45, 46A-64 (1958); D.C. Code Ann. §1-
2515 (1981); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§4501, 4601 (1953 and Supp. 
1986); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§515-3, 515-6, 516-62 (1968); Idaho 
Code Ann. §§67-5907, -5909 (1948); 111. Const, art. 1, §17; Ind. 
Code Ann. §22-9-1-2 (Burns 1986); Iowa Code §601A.13 (1974); Kan. 
Stat. Ann. §§44-1001, 44-1015 to 1016 (1964 & Supp. 1986); Ky. 
Rev. Stat. §§344.020, 344.360, 344.375 (1971); Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 5 §4583 (1967); Md. Code Ann. Art. 49B, §§21, 22, 24 
(1957); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. Ch. 121, §26FF (West 1932); Minn. 
Stat. Ann. §363.03 (1969); Mo. Ann. Stat §110, 215 (1959); Mont. 
Const, art. Ill, §3; Neb. Rev. Stat. §§20-105, 20-107, 29-109 
(1943 and Supp. 1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. §111.237 (1967); N.H. Rev, 
Stat. §§354-A: 3, 354-A:8 (1966); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§10:5-9.1, 
46:3-23 (1939); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§28-1-7, 30-13-2 (1978 & Supp. 
1981); N.Y. Civil Rights Law §§18a, 42 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 
1987); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law §5-331 (1969); N.C. Gen. Stat. §62-
140 (1982); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §4111.02 (1971); Okla. Stat. Ann, 
tit. 25 §1306 (West 1986); Ore. Rev. Stat. §659.045 (1971); Pa. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 43 §953 (1930); S.D. Codified Laws §11-7-61, 20-
13-29 (1967); Tenn. Code Ann. §§65-422, -423 (1955); Tex. Hum. 
Res. 1293a (Vernon 1962); Va. Code §§36-88, -91 (1950); Vt. Stat, 
Ann. tit. 13, §§1451, 1452 (1959); Wash. Rev. Code §§49.60.051, 
49.60.222, 49.60.224, 80.28.100 (1961); W. Va. Code Ann. §§5-11-
9, 8-12-9 (1984); Wis. Stat. §§101.22, 196.62 (1981 & Supp. 
1986) . 
7
 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§38-61(7), 38-150 (1958); D.C. Code Ann, 
§1-2517 (1981); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §515-5 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. 
§67-5908 (1948); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§344.367, 344.370 (1971 and 
supp. 1986); Md. Gen. Prov. Code Ann. §23 (1957); Mass Gen. Laws 
Ann. Ch. 151B, §§1-10 (West 1932); Neb. Rev. Stat. §20-108 
(1943); N. M. Stat. Ann. §28-1-7 (1978); N.Y. Ins. Law §40 
(McKinney 1976); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 40 §1008.3, tit. 43, §955 
(1930); S.C. Code Ann. §37-148 (1962); S.D. Comp. Laws §20-13-21 
(1967); Va. Code. §36-90 (Laws Co-op 1950); Wash. Rev. Code 
§§49.60.175, 51.04.030 (1961); W.Va. Code Ann. §5-11-9 (1984); 
Wis. Stat. §256.28 (1981 & Supp. 1986). 
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Fundamental to the Anglo-American legal system is the 
notion that the elected representative legislature is supreme in 
law making and shaping major public policy. Shelmidine v. Jones, 
550 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1976). It is through Utah lawmakers that 
current social and public demands resulting from changing 
economic and political state of affairs are enabled to find 
expression. Utah common law provided that theatre proprietors 
were not obligated to admit all persons desiring to purchase 
tickets, but could segregate or exclude persons of any class or 
race at pleasure. De La Ysla v. Publix Theatres Corp.. 26 P.2d 
818 (Utah 1933). Utah's interest in assuring equal access has 
changed since 1933 and expanded beyond merely proving access to 
tangible goods and services as reflected by the Utah Civil Rights 
Act. All persons within Utah are "entitled to full and equal 
accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, goods and 
services in all business establishments and'in all places of 
public accommodation, and by all enterprises regulated by the 
state of every kind whatsoever . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-3 
(1986) . 
Utah lawmakers may act with broad authority to create 
rights of public access on behalf of its citizens. Roberts v. 
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984). Mr. Justice 
Cardozo framed the problem this way, "[w]e do not pause to 
consider whether a statute differently conceived and framed would 
yield results more consonent with fairness and reason. We take 
the statute as we find it." Anderson v. Wilson, 289 U.S. 20, 27 
(1933). If the law appears harsh, its remedy is not in 
interpretation but in amendment or repeal. 
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B. ALTA CLUBfS CLAIM OF ASSOCIATIONAL 
FREEDOM IS NOT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
MAGNITUDE. 
The Alta Club argues that the enforcement of the Utah 
Civil Rights Act against it would violate associational freedoms 
belonging to its members as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and 
the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution and by the Utah 
Constitution* (App. A). However, persons with a common interest 
may associate exclusively with whom they please only if the 
nature of the association falls within the kind of activity 
intended to be embraced within constitutional guarantees. Curran 
v. Mt. Diablo Councilf 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 
(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984); 
Schwenk v. Boy Scouts of America, 551 P.2d 465, 475 n. 17 (Or. 
1976). The right of privacy is accorded only to those clubs 
functioning as "extensions of members1 homes and not as 
extensions of their businesses." Cornelius-v. Benevolent 
Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (D.C. Conn. 
1974). The constitutional protections for which the Alta Club 
seeks apply only to social relationships. 
In looking to the nature of an organization claiming 
associational freedom, the Court has not been satisfied by mere 
appearances. "Some businesses, like the classical country store 
where the owner lives overhead or in the rear, makes the store an 
extension, so to speak, of the home." Bell v. Md., 378 U.S. 226, 
253 (1964) (Goldberg, J. concurring). The fact that an 
organization qualifies as a "private club" under state liquor 
laws is not sufficient to overcome underlying factors supporting 
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a contrary conclusion* Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 
1153 (S.D. Tex* 1970). Nor does the fact that a club operates in 
a nonprofit capacity foreclose an inquiry into "distinctively 
private club" status. Rotary Club v. Bd. of Directorsf 178 Ca. 
App. 3d 1035, 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 220 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 
1986), OUT. postponed, 107 S.Ct. 396 (1986) .8 
Precedent has established some factors determinative of 
private club's status in other jurisdictions; such as limited use 
of facilities and services by members and bona fide guests, as 
well as the history of an organization. Cornelius, 382 F.Supp. 
at 1203. Each case roust be decided upon its own factual 
background. Wright, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153. "The more an 
owner', for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the 
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by 
the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." 
Bell, 378 U.S. at 314. The underlying structure of Alta Club's 
factual circumstances do not support Alta Club's "home away from 
home" facade, because the club is used "in a manner to make it of 
public consequence, and affect the community at large." let. at 
314, n. 33. 
Membership in the Alta Club is limited to business and 
professional men having established outstanding business and 
professional credentials in the community (R. 257). Privileges 
of the Alta Club may be extended to persons elected to or holding 
public office (R. 139) . Courtesies may also be extended "to such 
8
 A copy of California's brief as amicus curiae is attached 
hereto as App. F. 
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persons of distinction as the Board shall deem advisable" for a 
period of up to three months. (id*). Membership is not 
restricted to Salt Lake City residents. As of December 31, 1984, 
148 of its 635 members were domiciled outside of Salt Lake City 
or the State of Utah (R. 138, 234). 
The Alta Club was formed with the primary purpose of 
providing na place and the means for the conduct of business 
conferences and meetings of business and professional men . . . 
and of guests of such members" (R. 133) . The location of the 
Clubhouse is designated to be within proximity to the business 
district (Id). The emphasis placed upon extending guest 
invitations to the politically powerful and influential suggest 
minimal reliance upon subjective criteria (R. 139). 
Restrictions upon membership to the Alta Club do not 
reflect personal prejudices, but practical reasons. When the 
Alta Club was incorporated in 1933, women comprised less than 13 
percent of the total work force in the State. Utah Department of 
Employment Security, Hard at Work: Women in the Utah Labor Force 
4 (August 1985) (hereinafter, "Hard at Work") (App. G). The Alta 
Club's original Articles of Incorporation do not contain an 
express restriction against female membership. The language 
employed reflects the Alta Club's notion of the class of society 
available to make up the business and professional work force, 
not a desire to exclude women. 
Nor is the desire to exclude women a part of the Alta 
Club's contemporary wishes, at least for the sake of seclusion 
alone. A home represents "the essence of privacy, in no way 
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dedicated to public use, in no way extending an invitation to the 
public" Bell, 378 U.S. at 253. The Alta Club does not envince a 
pattern of exclusiveness or a primary objective to provide 
facilities only to men who are socially compatible in 
recreational and social pursuits* Business, professional and 
nonworking women may patronize the Alta Club. (R. 143-44). The 
Alta Club caters social and business affairs for any organization 
when sponsored by a club member. (R. 143-144). The freedom by 
which women may associate as guests and business associates, but 
not members, fatally undermines the notion that the social 
intimacy offered by the Alta Club is adversely affected by the 
presence of women. See, Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 
718 (1982) (men allowed to take classes offered by an all female 
university). In short, there is an expansive difference between 
the activity conducted within the walls of the Alta Club and the 
association found within the comforts and ltixuries of a home. 
C. ANY CLAIM BY ALTA CLUB OF ASSOCIATIONAL 
FREEDOM IS OUTWEIGHED BY UTAH'S COMPELLING 
INTEREST. 
Upon a finding that an associational activity rises to 
the level of Constitutional magnitude, a court must weigh whether 
the state's interest in eradicating discrimination justifies 
infringement on the organization's associational freedom. 
Roberts v. United States Javcees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Sigma Chi 
Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo.f 258 F. Supp. 515, 525 
(1966). Only minimal protection is afforded the right of 
intimate association. 468 U.S. at 618. 
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Stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship 
to actual abilities diminish the dignity of the individual, 
endangers the public and deprives society the benefits of 
political, economic and social integration. 
The experience with the freedom or civil 
rights movement of black people has made it 
clear that withholding of equal rights is 
different from slavery only in degree, and 
that ultimate personal liberty depends on the 
civil right to be treated equally with other 
people, without discrimination because of 
race, other minority membership, sex, or any 
other ground. 
3A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction, §74.01, at 626 
(4th ed. 1986) . 
As of 1984, 40 percent of Utahfs female population were 
employed in managerial and professional occupations. Hard at 
Work, 52. Regardless of education, experience or occupation, 
women have averaged only 60 percent of male counterpart earnings 
over the last three decades. i<3. at 74. A* growing number of 
economists believe that a "two-track" system is emerging with 
female inroads into top management being stymied, id. at 69. 
Although many of the clubs and organizations 
which close their doors to women insist they 
do no harm because they are strictly social 
or purely altruistic, in fact they are places 
for profitable exchange with business and 
professional colleagues and clients. They 
provide settings where individuals pursuing 
career-related ventures have opportunities to 
display their talents and be helped in their 
career development. 
Exclusion of Women, 18 Harv. C. - C.L.L. Rev. 321, 330 n. 30. 
Membership to the right club often holds the key to development 
and maintenance of political and economic success as well as 
community leadership, id. at 323 n. 4. Membership in the Alta 
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Club conveys automatic business and professional recognition and 
provides the opportunity for contact with resident and non-
resident leaders, as well as enhanced leadership skills through 
board membership or position as a club officer. 
"Indivious private discrimination may be characterized 
as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the 
First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative 
constitutional protections." Hishon v. King and Spalding, 467 
U.S. 69, 78 (1984) . 
In constitutional terms, club members who 
defend the exclusion of women rely upon 
rights of privacy and association, but 
neither right includes the ability to exclude 
women from clubs. The constitutional right 
to privacy has been defined as an aspect of 
liberty encompassing a sphere of private life 
rarely extending beyond the narrow confines 
of home and family. 
Exclusion of Women, at 347. The clubhouse is simply, "not on the 
same constitutional plane as is the bedroom-or study." 
Cornelius, 382 F. Supp, at 1195-96. 
Moreover, where a club associates freely with the class 
of persons it claims protection from, there is no basis for 
concluding that, having considered and found favorable the 
application of a female professional of the caliber now 
associating with the club, the organization's ability to engage 
in selective membership objectives will be impeded or radically 
changed. Like the Minnesota Act upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Roberts v. Javcees, Utah "abridges no more speech or 
associational freedom than is necessary to accomplish that 
purpose." 468 U.S. 609, 629 (1984). 
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The State has a compelling interest in avoiding the 
perception that it condones rigid perceptions held by enterprises 
it regulates that women are not appropriate participants where 
business and professional power is exercised. 
IcJlubs can be seen as the community's spinal 
column, connecting the vertebrae of business, 
industry, finance, politics, the universities 
and the foundations. Within the clubs, this 
spine can stiffen with the relentless 
homogeneity of an anachrostic power 
structure, or it can be supple enough to 
support a more dynamic city. 
Exclusion of Women at 405. Participation of women at the seminal 
stage where political and economic decisions are made are, in 
many ways, a greater harm than occupational segregation; because 
the decisions made are later translated into policy and practice 
affecting all society. "The right of men to associate in what is 
clearly more than a social capacity must give way to the right of 
women to associate at the level where contacts are made, 
0 
relationships are developed and deals are struck." Id. at 407. 
POINT III 
THE TERM "ALL PLACES OF BUSINESS WHICH 
SELL BEER TO CONSUMERS- IS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
CLEAR AND EXACT. 
The provisions of the Utah Civil Rights Act are 
constitutional clear and exact. The Alta Club urges that the 
phrase "all places of business which sell beer to consumers" is 
vague on the basis that the phrase "place of business" either 
means "'a profit-seeking enterprise1" and therefore does not 
aPPlY to the Alta Club, or is simply too vague to pass 
constitutional muster. APPELLANTS BRIEF at 35-36. A similar 
argument is made about the term "consumers." Id. at 36. 
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Application of the facts of record to constitutionally-imposed 
standards, however, supports a ruling that would uphold the Act. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described the standard to be 
applied in determining vagueness: 
When state action impinges on fundamental 
rights, due process requires standards which 
clearly define the scope of permissible 
conduct so as to avoid unwarranted intrusion 
on those rights. The statute which affects 
fundamental liberties is unconstitutional if 
it is so vague that "men of common 
intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning . . . ." 
In re the Matter of Nelda Bover, 636 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1981) 
(citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1925)). Vagueness issues relate essentially to procedural due 
process; that is, whether the statute adequately provides notice 
of the required conduct. Connally, 269 U.S. at 391. A statute 
will not be declared unconstitutionally vague if its language is 
"sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct 
is prohibited." State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982). 
Statutes are endowed with a strong presumption of 
validity, Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 1983), 
and legislation will not be declared invalid for vagueness unless 
it is so imperfect as to render it capable of no reasonable 
construction that will give it effect. Kent Club v. Toronto, 305 
P.2d 870, 873 (Utah 1957); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 807 
(Utah 1974). The Utah Civil Rights Act clearly indicates that 
all places of business electing to sell beer or liquor to its 
members and patrons may not discriminate on the basis of gender. 
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Blacks Law Dictionary defines the phrase "place of 
business" as, "Itlhe location at which one carries on his 
business or employment," Black1s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition 
(1979)9 p. 1034. The term "business" is further defined by 
Black's Law Dictionary as fol lows: 
Employment, occupation, profession, or 
commercial activity engaged in for gain or 
livelihood. Activity or enterprise for gain, 
benefit, advantage or livelihood. . . . 
Enterprise in which person engaged shows 
willingness to invest time and capital on 
future outcome . . . . That which habitually 
busies or occupies or engages the time, 
attention, labor, and effort of persons as a 
principle serious concern or interest or for 
livelihood or profit. 
Blackfs Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition (1979), p. 179. 
According to Alta Club Articles of Incorporation, the 
Alta Club "is organized in, and its principal place of business 
shall be at Salt Lake City. . . ." (R. 133) (emphasis added). 
The Articles of Incorporation further provide that: 
The object, purpose and pursuit of said 
corporation is and shall continue to be, to 
acquire, equip, maintain, operate and 
establish • . . within reasonable proximity 
to the business district. . . a place and the 
means for the conduct of business conferences 
and meetings of business and professional men 
who shall comprise its members and of guests 
of such members. . . . [T]his corporation 
shall have power to acquire, sell, receive, 
hold, improve and disprove of such property, 
real and personal, whether obtained by 
purchase, gift or devise, as may be necessary 
or desirable to carry on or promote the 
objects of this corporation. 
(R. 133). 
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The Alta Club is a business. The Alta Club entrusted 
to its Board of Directors "the management of the business and 
affairs of this corporation and the care, custody and control of 
the corporate property." id. at 2. Board members are authorized 
to determine, levy and collect fees, dues and assessments, and to 
expell members for default under payments due. id. Directors 
authorize all club expenditures including the hiring, salaries, 
Christmas bonuses and removal of its employees, id. at. 3, 23. 
Members are not liable for corporate debts but may receive a 
portion of surplus of assets over obligations in the event of 
dissolution, id. at 6. The Alta Club is open between the hours 
of 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m. during which time members and guests 
may enjoy the services and amenities offered by the dining rooms, 
bar, barber shop and other facilities, including the parking lot. 
id. at 21. 
The legislative history and stated purposes of the Act 
are clear that the definition of business is intended to be 
broadly construed to apply to all types of businesses which offer 
all types of goods, services and facilities. Utah Code Ann. §13-
7-1 (1986) . The activities engaged in by the Alta Club meet the 
definition of "business" found in Black's Law Dictionary and the 
words used by the Alta Club itself in forming its organization 
support the conclusion that its corporation is a place of 
business. 
The term "consumer" is defined in Black's Law 
Dictionary as "[o]ne who consumes. Individuals who purchase, 
use, maintain, and dispose of products and services. A member of 
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that broad class of people who are affected by pricing policies, 
financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit 
reporting, debt collection, and other trade practices. . . ." 
Black1s Law Dictionary, 286 (4th ed. 1979). Members of the Alta 
Club and their guests purchase and consume food and beverages. 
They pay for the privilege of use and enjoyment of the club's 
facilities and services and members forfeit privileges where 
credit has been extended but not paid. (R. 133)• 
The Utah Civil Rights Act is not overbroad. Statutory 
overbreadth, unlike a vagueness challenge, raises substantive due 
process concerns regarding whether, "•the statute in question is 
so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior but 
may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well."1 
Utah v. Frampton, No. 20279 (Utah April 9, 1987). It is well 
established that the state may legitimately regulate the sale of 
beer and liquor for the protection of its citizens. Any 
organization desiring to sell alcoholic products must be licensed 
to do so. Utah Code Ann., Title 32A (1986). Members of a social 
club may discriminate against those persons it so pleases in the 
context of purely social relationships. When a club elects to 
apply for and receive a license to sell alcoholic beverages, it 
thereby becomes an enterprise regulated by the state subject to 
such rules and regulations attached to the license. Kent Club v. 
Toronto. 305 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1957). It follows, then, that 
since neither the Utah nor United States Constitution protects 
individious discrimination by business regulated by the state, 
challenges based upon broadness claims are without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Legislative history and circumstances surrounding the 
Utah Civil Rights Act support a ruling that a club desiring to 
sell beer and liquor to patrons is an "enterprise regulated by 
the state" and therefore must abide by state regulations 
concerning gender discrimination. 
The Alta Club's claim of associational freedom does not 
rise to the level intended to be embraced within constitutional 
guarantees, and is further outweighed by Utah's interest in the 
elimination of gender discrimination by enterprises regulated by 
the state. 
The language of the Act is sufficiently clear to define 
the scope of permissible conduct and does not impose upon 
activity protected by either the state or federal constitutions. 
Therefore, this Court should find the Utah Civil Rights Act 
constitutional on its face and as applied to the Alta Club. 
DATED this /*~ day of ^C/^r^ , 1987. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DIANE W. WILKINS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, Section 1 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable 
rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties: to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the 
dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and 
petition for redress of grievances; to 
communicate freely their thoughts and 
opinions, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right. 
APPENDIX B 
April 14, 1987 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Senate 
HB No. 
record 
1973. 
As the Official Officer and Secretary of the Utah State 
f I do attest to and certify that the attached transcript of 
311, DISCRIMINATION ON BASIS OF SEX, is a true and actual 
taken from the Official Senate Recordings, #320, March 8, 
Respectfully submitted, 
Sophia C. Buckmiller 
Official Officer and 
Secretary, Utah State Senate 
My Commission expires 
May 1, 1987 
Senator Howe: Mr. President, I was just calling 
Representative Urie to see if she wanted to come over and explain 
it tH.B. No. 311] — but, I think it's rather self-explanatory. 
The purpose of it is, I think, to put into our law, a prohibition 
against discrimination on account of sex. We already have it 
on — that we can't discriminate on the basis of race, color, 
religion, ancestry, national origin; but it was not -
discrimination on the basis of sex was not included, in this 
written law, which was passed in 1965. This is the law, the 
antidiscrimination law really of 1965. Then I note also that it 
includes not only places of public accommodation but in 
enterprises regulated by the state. Now Ifm not just sure, 
frankly, what that means, "enterprises regulated by the state," 
but I suppose that it would be — 
. Senate President: It's - the explanation is on the 
next page, Senator Howe. 
Senator Howe: Oh. 
Senate President: Line 19. [Pause] Just about 
everybody . . . 
Senator Howe: That's right. In other words, it just, 
applies, prohibits discrimination generally against women. We're 
not doing — discriminating now anyhow so this bill won't hurt 
anybody. 
Senate President: I'm, I'm not sure about one thing — 
can you tell me for sure — 
Senator Howe: About what? 
Senate President: I almost hate to mention it — but, 
the only place I know of, is the Alta Club that has a separate 
entrance for women — 
[laughter] 
Senator Howe: This, this may change that — 
Senator [not identified]: Mr. President . . . 
President: Senator 
Senator [not identified]: Senator Howe, are you open 
for question? 
Senator Howe: I will. 
Senator [not identified]: Senator Howe, it seem to me, 
that on the Equal Rights Amendment, that the place we got into 
trouble was where there might be additional responsibilities 
under the law, to women. Now this pretty well confines it to the 
idea that you can't discriminate against a woman as far as taking 
away privileges and so we're not really talking about the same 
thing here are we? 
Senator Howe: No. This, this is just much, much 
limited. This isn't the whole area like the E.R.A. was. 
. . . . 
Discrimination on Basis of Sex: Hearing on H.B. 311, 
40th Leg., 1973 Utah Laws 33 (statements of Sen. Warren E. Pugh, 
President, and Sen. Richard C. Howe). 
APPENDIX C 
MEMORANDUM # 1 
To: Utah State Legislature 
Prom: Utah Liquor Control Commission 
Date: January 9# 1985 
Re: B. No. , Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 
1985f General Session. 
This memorandum has been prepared to highlight and explain the 
attached proposed legislation revising Utah's present Liquor Con-
trol Act, Title 32 of the Utah Code, and Utah's Non-profit Pri-
vate Club Act, Sections 16-6-12.1 through 17. A second memoran-
dum covering the legislation chapter by chapter is separately 
attached. 
Legislative History of Utah's Liquor Laws 
Most of the existing law today governing the control and regula-
tion of the sales, storage and consumption of liquor and other 
alcoholic products in the state was enacted in 1935t following 
the repeal of prohibition. This basic law has been the subject 
of numerous minor amendments over the years dealing mainly with 
the internal functioning of the commission. The majority of 
these have concerned raising the taxes on beer and liquor, ad-
Justing fees and operating budgets, allocating the revenues from 
liquor sales, creating a director of liquor control, either in-
creasing or decreasing the size of the commission and modifying 
its duties, creating a citizens' council and a liquor law en-
forcement division of public safety. Some major amending efforts 
have occurred Including the provision for non-profit private 
locker clubs In 1955• eliminating the use of private permits by 
(f) Adopting, as far as applicable, the much more com-
prehensive forfeiture procedures of Utah's present Con-
trolled Substance Act for forfeiting to the atate al-
coholic products or property used in violation of this 
•ct; 
(h) Clearly identifying those prosecuting agencies 
having the responsibility for initiating prosecutions 
under this act and delineating how such prosecutions 
are initiated; 
(10) Providing a dram shop act which, unlike present law, clear-
ly covers all alcoholic beverages (including 3-2 percent by 
weight beer). 
(11) Establishing a bureau within the department of public safe-
ty responsible for the enforcement of this act; 
(12) Adopting a standard form of weights and measures utilized 
by the federal government in describing alcoholic products, to 
wit: percent of alcohol by volume rather than by weight. Thus, 
*3-2 beer" is now referred to as beer having lJ.0 percent of al-
cohol by volume. 
The commission has endeavored throughout this legislation to pre-
serve, wherever possible, the substantive provisions of Utah's 
present liquor laws and, as stated earlier, has retained the 
overall philosophy and policies of those laws. Indeed, it is the 
commission's view that it is an entity of government having the 
duty to enforce the laws presented to it by the Legislature, and 
should avoid becoming Involved in disputes over what the sub-
stance of the law ahould or ahould not be. Such efforts are bet-
ter left to the various factions of the community interested in 
and affected by liquor control. However, during the course of 
preparing this legislation, the commission encountered some areas 
of the present law where tome substantive change would clearly 
Improve the administration and effectiveness of the overall law. 
Bather than defer action in hopes that the amending process might 
make the needed improvements at a later time, the commission 
chose to incorporate them into this legislation, but did ao most 
cautiously and only where it felt the effectiveness of the law 
would be enhanced. Those few substantive changes proposed by 
this legislation which are of significance are outlined below. 
Substantive Changes in the New Legislation 
1. The concept that liquor sales in restaurants and private 
clubs are from "state liquor stores" located in an area 
within such facilities which is leased by the state, but 
operated by a vendor associated with the restaurant or club, 
has been eliminated in favor of a licensing system with In-
creased and more direct regulation of the licensee. The new 
system results in a tightening of existing law and more 
closely resembles the actual administrative practice of the 
present commission. The "state store in restaurants and 
clubs" concept originated in the 1969 amendments to au-
thorize the sale of liquor in such facilities, yet still 
give the state a degree of control over the liquor outlet so 
that the state could, at will, and with or without cause, 
close "its" outlet and remove "its" liquor. 
As a practical matter, this concept adds a non-essential 
administrative burden on the department, causes duplicated 
paperwork in the authorization and regulation of such out-
lets, and requires the use of artificial lease agreements 
between the state and such facilities. 
All clubs where liquor is consumed are required under pres-
ent law to have licenses from the commission to allow the 
atorage and consumption of liquor on their premises. Res-
taurants must obtain local government approval before they 
can apply to the commission to have a "state store*1 on their 
premises which virtually always includes obtaining a local 
atorage and consumption license. (See U.C.A., Sections 10-
8-*J2 and 10-13-6). Thus, restaurants and clubs having so-
called "state stores" on their premises from which liquor 
sales nay be made are licensed anyway and the vendor of that 
atore is usually the same person or entity accountable under 
the license. The commission, in fact, now Issues state 
store leases and liquor consumption licenses to clubs in 
tandem, and almost always suspends or revokes the consump-
tion and storage license in tandem with the state store 
lease where a violation of the act has occurred. However, 
recently the commission sought to summarily remove "its" 
state store from a private club pursuant to the concept that 
it was really closing its own store and removing its own 
liquor. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that despite the lan-
guage of the act, the club nevertheless had a property 
interest in having the state store located on its premises, 
and held that the club was entitled to a modicum of pro-
cedural due process before the state could close and remove 
the state store. See Celebrity Club. Inc.. vs. ULCC. Utah, 
657 P.2d 1292 (1982). x 
Thus, the State's only effort to assert the legal distinc-
tion between the license Issued to a club (which admittedly 
carries with it a limited property Interest once issued) and 
the leasing of space within a club for a state store (to 
avoid the assertion of a property interest by the club in 
the outlet) has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
1
 The club has also filed a civil rights suit in federal court 
against the commission for its summary action which Is presently 
pending in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
. n . 
The "state store" concept also requires the commission to 
Bake nominal monthly lease payments to restaurants and clubs 
throughout the state to pay for the space within the prem-
ises where the state store Is located. While the cost Is 
nominal, it adds to the administrative paperwork of the 
agency. Also the lease arrangement creates questions of 
liability when thefts, damage, etc., occur, and could create 
similar liability questions under the Dram Shop provisions. 
(Confusion is created over who really owns and has control 
over the liquor.) 
The new legislation has dropped the "state store" concept in 
favor of regulating the sales outlets in restaurants and 
clubs under a single license which authorizes the storage, 
consumption * and sales of liquor on the premises. The 
operational restrictions on the restaurants and clubs has 
been Increased to give the commission greater regulatory 
control over such licensees. In the event a violation is 
found after due process has been accorded to the licensee, 
the license is suspended or revoked which necessarily leads 
to the removal of the liquor from the premises among other 
sanctions. No leases are required under this system, and 
the state has really not lost any real degree of actual con-
trol over the outlet. 
Finally, this system does not convert Utah from a control 
state to a so-called license state. In fact, all control 
states utilize this license system. A true license state is 
* Consumption of liquor in restaurants would still be permis-
lible without a license from the state if authorized by local 
luthorlty. However, atorage and sales would have to be au-
thorized by a state license as a substitute for the state's con-
trol under the "state store" concept. Arguably, with the added 
restrictions on operation under the new legislation, the extent 
»f state control would actually Increase over that of present 
law. 
APPENDIX D 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: Utah State Legislature 
FROM: Utah Liquor Control Commission 
DATE: 
RE: S.B, N0.__, ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL ACT, 1985, GENERAL 
SESSION. 
This memo has been prepared for the legislature to detail 
and enhance the accompanying summary memorandum. Contained in 
this memo is a detailed section-by-section comparison of the 
proposed Alcoholic Beverage Control Act with the now existing 
Utah liquor laws. All additions to and deletions from the 
current law have also been noted. Any significant changes 
contained in this proposed act are high-lighted and where 
necessary an explanation of the change has been included. 
The memo has been written in an outline form progressing 
section-by-section through the PROPOSED statutes. To completely 
appreciate all of the changes which have been made and to 
understand where and how the original law has been retained, it 
is suggested that the reader compare both the new statute and the 
present law from which it was derived. For the sake of brevity 
the outline does not always use complete sentences and so the 
indulgence of the reader is requested. 
DETAILED CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER OUTLINE 
CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL PROVISIONS 
CURRENT PROPOSED 
32-1-1 32-1-1. Name of act changed to Alcoholic Beverage 
Control Act to better reflect the scope of adminis-
tration the commission and department are charged to 
fulfill. 
New Section 32-1-2. Effective date of the law. 
New Section 32-1-3. Application of this law to present 
licensees, permittees and violators of the act. 
1 
32-1-50, 32-9-^• Application requirements. A merger of sev-
1-53,1-56, *ral current sections into one section. Few sub-
1-58 stantive changes. A new $100 non-refundable appli-
cation fee has been added. 
32-1-51 32-9-5- Bond. New bonding requirement of $10,000. 
32-1-50, 32-9-6. Operational restrictions. Few changes from 
1-53#1-56 present law. Some restrictions, including new 
accounting provisions for warehousers have been add-
ed. 
CHAPTER 10 - BEER WHOLESALING; RETAIL BEER SALES 
32-H-16 -32-10-1. Beer Wholesaling. Commission's power to 
grant beer wholesaling licenses. 
32-^-16 32-10-2. Qualifications. Prohibits convicted felons 
and minors from obtaining a license., No wholesaler 
say also retail beer. 
New Section 32-10-3. Duties before granting. Outlines all con-
siderations the commission must make before granting 
a license. 
32-H-16 32-10-JJ. Application requirements. A new clearer 
statement of what applicants must present to the 
commission for its consideration. 
New Section 32-10-5. Bond. New $10,000 bonding requirement. 
32-14-16 32-10-6. Operational restrictions. A basic re-
statement of present law with provisions from 
present regulations added. 
32-H-17 32-10-7. Retail licenses. No changes from pre-
sent law. 
New Section 32-10-8. Prohibited possessions. New section meant 
to control the distribution of beer from the whole-
sale to the retail level. 
CHAPTER 11 - BEER TAXES 
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SECTION 2 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
In Utah, women eofspr:** more than 41 percent of the work force. 
That percentage is eonsister.i increasing. 
Host women, married rr i. t, work because of economic 
necessity, rorty-five percert c: ai: working women in Utah are single or 
separated. Two-earner househoics increased from 22 percent to 50 percnt 
from 1960 to I960. Adoitional women work in support of displaced workers 
(husbands underemployed or unemployed due to technolo&ic?l advances). 
An average woman works 26 years—up from 14.5 years in 1950. They 
are deployed primarily in secondary or part-time positions providing 
little pay, few benefits, inadequate family support systems, and limited 
opportunity for advancement. In Utah, women are paid 54^ for every SI 
earned by sen. This pay differential has not significantly changed in 20 
years. 
Occupational segregation* poor compensation, aM l imited career 
opportunit ies are primarily rooted in' iong-stervdiojg cul tural maife-ZeaAle 
s tereotyping which, desp i te the f a c t s , cnntini/c to asfcign *en to the 
work-plate and woven tQ the hotoe, i n s t i t u t umal s t ruc tures , founded on 
s tereotyping , deprive women of achieving economic indeperd^nca arui 
deprive the work place of t h e i r .potential contr ibut ion. 
Families headed by females comprise the fastest growing segment of 
the poverty population in Utah and in the United States. In Utah, the 
number of families with female heads has grown to 10 percent. Forty-two 
percent (12,100) of these families with children under 18 live below the 
poverty level. Both in Utah and nationwide this is a rapidly 
accelerating problem auguring long-range catastrophic consequences. 
The recoraendations that follow are based on these findings. 
A. SUKHAPY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. to Business and Industry: 
Business and industry has a stake in helping female heads-of 
households living in poverty overcome obstacles limiting women's ability 
to become self-sufficient. Business and industry also has a stake in 
helping single female heads of households successfully integrate into the 
work force. Therefore, business and industry has a responsibility to 
help solve problems that plague women such as equal pay for equal work, 
inadequate or non-existent child care, lack of access to transportation, 
inflexible work schedules and hours, inadequate health insurance and 
retirement benefits. 
A meaningful job with adequate pay is the key to solving the 
economic and family problems facing single female heads-of-households 
Business and industry is the primary keystone for providing these jobs. 
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COAL: THE COMMUNITY, 1NCLUDINC TEACHERS. ADMINISTRATORS. PARENTS, 
AND~OTHERS MUST BE HADE AWARE OF THE ABSOLUTE IMPORTANCE OF 
PROV1D1NC THE KIND OF EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH CIRLS ARE 
ENCOURAGED TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT. 
Recommendation: Organize a speaker's bureau, under the 
sponsorship of the Governor's office, consisting of 
knowledgeable individuals to tell the community of the 
importance of promoting educational practices that encourage 
girls to become self-sufficient. 
Recommendation: Encourage groups and organizations involved 
in parent education to include a section, in their 
curriculum, emphasizing the development of skills that will 
enable women to achieve a self-sufficient status. 
Recommendation: Give public recognition to programs that 
successfully promote the concept of self-sufficiency for 
womer* and to individual women who have become 
self-sufficient. 
Responsible Entities: 
Governor Parent-Teacher Associations 
Media Groups offering Parents Courses 
Teachers/Principals Parents 
SOCIETAL AKJ CULTURAL BAPPIERS 
SHORT-TERM SOLUTIONS 
BAPrlEP Many women are unprepared educationally (lack of skills) and 
emotionally (lack ox self-esteer: and underestimation of skills and 
abilities^ to enter the jot market. 
COAL: INCREASE SELF-ESTEEM OF WOMEN WHO UNDERESTIMATE THEIR 
SKILLS AND ABILITIES TO ENTER THE JOB KAKKET. 
Recommendation: Hake mechanisms available that assess 
present skills and abilities which are transferable to the 
job market. 
Recomendat ion • Provide testing instruments that measure 
aptitudes, interest, and career potential. 
Rtcommtndat ion: Strengthen and develop programs of 
education and skills training, (personal, social tad 
technical) that prepare women for work and career mobility. 
RtcoiTfttendat ion: Strengthen and develop appropriate support 
systems and resources (day care, transportation, counseling, 
etc.). 
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Responsible Entities: 
Job Service Department of Social Services 
Skills Training Centers Labor Training Office 
Churches Private Non-Profit Organizations 
Legislature Civic Service Organizations 
University Program Vocational and Extension Programs 
Families 
COAL: INCREASE EDU TV-^d. PREPARATION OF WOMEN HATCHED TO THE 
CURRENT JOB MARKET .M\, GROWTH TRENDS. 
Recommends*: n: Tailor educational and skills training to 
rer.it in r^  rketable skills that relate to job availability 
with growth potential. 
Recommendation: Assess realistic growth trends in 
employment and make available to this population. 
Recommendation: Provide paid on-the-job experience. 
Rec ommenda tion: Tailor educational methods to meet the 
special needs of adult females to provide positive 
reinforcement. 
Recommendation: Provide physical access to information 
about General Equivalency Diploma preparation and testing. 
Recommendation: Strengthen and develop appropriate systems 
and resources (day care, transportation, counseling, etc.). 
Responsible Entities: 
Employers Legislature 
Job Services Department of Social Services 
Media Bureau of Economic Development 
Churches Volunteer Associations 
Local School Districts/Adult Education 
University Continuing Education, Vocational and 
Extension Programs 
COAL: INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF SUCCESSFUL PERFORMANCE AND 
ADVANCEMENT OF TARGET POPULATION. 
Recommendation: Target specific and substantial resources 
through Jobs Training Partnership Act, National Alliance of 
Businesses, etc for low income women. 
Recommendation: Establish ongoing public relations to: 
a. highlight and reward successful performance of 
women. 
b. highlight and raward svccessful participation of 
•mployers, madia, government agencies and support 
groups. 
•21-
c. create laechanisms to ensure continuity through: 
i. loaned executives to solicit participation 
from other businesses. 
lie legislation for scholarship opportunities 
through unemployment insurance, Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AJDC) 
transfers to e-mployers, atate tax credits, etc 
BecoTTgnendat ion- Educate atnployers regarding fiscal 
incentives for hiring low income women. 
Responsible Entities: 
Job Service Employers 
Legislature Bureau of Economic Development 
Chamber of Commerce JTPA, BABs, etc. 
Media Department of Social Services 
Churches Civic and Service Organizations 
County and Local Governments 
Volunteer Associations 
University Continuing Education, Vocational and 
txtension Programs 
BAFFIEP Laws, policies and practices that directly or indirectly 
continue to discriminate against woren 
CCAL° CHANCE LAWS. POLICIES AKD PRACTICES THAT DIRECTLY OR 
IKIKECT^Y DISCRIMINATE ACA1WCT WOKE*. 
Becorrvendation: Review and identify laws currently on the 
books 
Becoraendaticn: Introduce corrective legislation with 
enforcement provisions. 
Recomendat ion: Beview and identify employment policies and 
practices in both the public and private sector. 
Becommendat ion Becommend policies and practices that 
create econotric equity, innovative work scheduling and 
fringe benefits tailored to the needs of ferrule single heads 
of households 
Responsible Entities-
Job Service Employers 
Legislature Bureau of Economic Development 
Chamber of Commerce JTPA, BABs, etc 
Media Department of Social Services 
Churches Civic and Service Organizations 
County and Local Governments 
Volunteer Associations 
University Continuing Education, Vocational and 
Extension Programs 
-22-
BARRIER: Lack of the use of networks by. for, and In behalf of women. 
COAL: THE CREATION AND 51RENCTHENINC OF METVORXS, BY, rOH AND ON 
BEHALF OF WOMEN. 
Recommendation: I-*PT fy networks which currently exist and 
significant contacts vit).n those networks. 
RecoTTtmendation: Educate existing networks as to problems 
and needs. 
Recommendation: Create networks which focus on these needs. 
Recommendation: Educate women on how to use them. 
Responsible Entities: 
Business Assoc. Professional Associations 
Labor Unions Private Non-Profit Organizations 
Media Chamber of Commerce 
Churches Civic Organizations 
Educational and Vocational Institutions 
LONG TERM SOLUTIONS: 
BARRIER: Societal and cultural beliefs that encourage women to accept 
a role in which they are dependent, which creates: 
a. feelings of guilt if they work outside the home 
b. discouragement of career aspirations 
c. encouragement of the tendency to marry at an early age 
COAL: TO CHANCE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BELIEFS THAT CAUSE WOMEN TO BE 
DEPENDENT. 
RecoTTTnendation: Increase awareness of the extent of women 
end their children in poverty. 
Recommendation: Educate children as to the social and 
economic issues relating to families: 
a. Costs related to the maintenance of marriage and family. 
b. Social and economic costs of marital break-up and 
remarriage resulting from death, divorce and dissertion. 
c. Social and economic costs for children out-of-wedlock. 
d. Chances for failure of an early marriage. 
e. Increased self-esteem and self-fulfillment resulting 
from meaningful salaried employment. 
f. Advantages and options of dual-parental sources of 
income. 
%. Educate girls as to their responsibility to be eble to 
eupport themselves. 
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
The Slalo of California, hv it* Attorney tfcncrnl John 
K. Van ill* Knmp, rrs|maf dilly stil»mit»< thix hrief as miik'tia 
fiirino pniMtnnt to Supreme Court Role 'MiJ. 
Wilhiii Hie IViln.il syslftn, slate* have lontr played 
nn •*«i*iitinl rod* in |ii*nliil»ilinir ilisrtiminaf it»n liv private 
enferpri<r< nlTrrle«l uifh ;i |ml*li«* inh're^l. In California. 
Ihi^ iiiiMitiMii la\i ilnrdim* fir<l nwivnl vfntnfor% iiM'n^ni 
fifin in l^»7 (fnl. Slats. is?»7. rh. |IK. * I. |i. i:S7)t ami in 
now riMhlinl in !!••• I'lirnh l'i\il IfiL'lifs Aet# California 
I 
• I 
I Code { Til ( f i l l . S tn lK I !»:•!•, r l i . I Mill. >• I , p. 4\2\). lit 
W , l\ O i l . M -JtCi. Jl-J - I I t l !»Tn|. Mnn> slates, MM Intl 
Cal i forn ia . ••n:iff«*«l statutes I'm Imlilinir di>ei imiiintion 
mhlir ai*rtiniiiitMla1i<MiN in respon>e to I!••• holdtiii: in Mir 
I Itnilit* tax*. !•»•• r .s . : : i i^s::), that the federal gov 
iient hatl no jNiwi r 1o piohihi l >in h private i l i^n iinina 
/i»fi- / ,o HfllsiitH In. I . Mtth",,,H, IYM\ I S. JS, I I I 
I S ) . 
Appel lant* herein challenge tin* application of tin* 
nil Civ i l Rights Art to p iohihi l dUe i imiiintion mi lite 
s of >e\ hy a hn;:e association of pr ivate eluhs and 
contend Dial 1 lit* I i iruh Af t is uiironstitulionallx vague 
overbroad. The State of Ca l i forn ia has a dircet ami 
pcll ing interest in preserving its statute and therefore 
rs this i'oiiit to grant np| cllees* motion to dismiss tin* 
nal, or f in the al ternat ive, to a f f i r m t!••• derision of the 
rt hrlow. 
T h r Stat r of Cal i fornia ha* a strong i n t n r s l in pre 
•ing the hrond interpretat ion of thr I 'nriil i Art e \ -
**ed in the i lrr isimi hrlow lev thr Cal i fornia Co in ! ol 
•eal. Tin* court ' * i n t i i p r r la t ion is roiisislrnl with thr 
Uison law of Cal i fornia and with tin* legislative deep 
i In codify thr rmninon law. C m I h r i m o i e , the Sta i r 
Cal i fornia, ns expressed in A r t i r l e I, \H of the Cali-
ilia Constitution1 has a strong puhlie policy of ensnr 
that hiisiness opportunities are not denied mi the hasis 
<cx. 
1
 Artie I f I, ^ II fit the C .tlitorm.i ( nret ih i t ioo provides ",i pcr-
m.iy nol he chsi|ii.ihliril I rum enlenop, <M ptn\umj'% .i I H I M -
s, profession, vo< .ilion or emplr i\ ineol tici.tiise ot s« \ , I . l ie, 
e<l, < olor, or n.thon.il or e lhni i origin " 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I n l!>77, thr Rotary Club of Dunrte ( D u a r t e ) admitted 
Hirer women as members. I totnry l i i ternationnl then re-
voked h n a r l e ' s eharter as a lorn I Rotary Cluh and termi -
n:tf<••! i t * i i i rmhr i^hip in Rotary Internat ional , claiming 
that ht iar te hud violatetl its oliliiratiou to ah'ule hy the 
rules of Rotary In ternat ional . These rules require local 
I totary Cluhs to limit membership to men. 
h u a r t e . together wi th two of its women mernhrrs t sued 
I totary Inte l national for injunctive ;mtl declaratory relief, 
seeking to enjoin I to tary Internat ional f rom revoking 
Ihmrte 's eharter and f rom enforcing the male only meni-
hership rule, nnd seeking n dcr larat ion Hint Hie male only 
rule violated the Cnruh Civ i l Rights A r t , Cal i fornia Civ i l 
Code seetiou 5 1 , and Ar t i r l e I , § M of the Culi fornia Con-
st i tut ion. 
T h e Los Angeles County Superior Court ruled in favor 
of Rotary Internat ional r inding that it hatl not violated 
tin* C i i iuh Act. T h e Court of Appeal reversed, concluding 
that I fo larv Internat ional was a loudness establishment 
within Hie meaning or the Cnruh Act and thus was pro-
hibited f rom discr iminat ing on the hasis of sex. 
T h r Court of Appeal denied Rotary Internat ional** 
petition for rehear ing ami the Cal i forn ia Supreme Court 
denied its petition fur review. 
4 
SUMMARY Or ARGUMENT 
ruse ilne* not present it siihsfniilinl (Vtlcral i|iies-
involves issue* fh;il were <|cci<lc«l hy this Court 
7* r. fnilnl Stutrs ./•*/* t i> . 4(M l \ N . fill!I ( I ' lSI ) 
eiita no Hicls Hull woiihl ilistiuuuish il from I In* 
ittt ram*. 
ry International i* not Hie ty|x» of orjrani/alion 
cinder*, mi l inl ing lo Huberts, mny nssert first 
til rights of iiititiiulo I I IMI expressive association. 
otary International has tin Imtiiiiii meinliers its it 
Krifilioii of mcml»ei>hip chilis. Itnscil on litis fact 
ihstantinl dusiiicss-like nlliitalics, (In* slnlc Court 
nsistcnt willi Itnbvrt*. ffliiiml Hint Notary Itiler-
fin It! not insulate its (mlicy of iliscriiuituilitiK on 
of sex in nictitdcrship froni operation of tin* I'n-
KieJifs Art which prohihifs HIICII iliseriminnlion. 
iilsn t*oiifa|iiile<l9 consistent with Huberts, Hint any 
ailment rights of Itolurv International were out-
iy t*iilifi»rfiiii*H cotupeMittK slate interest in climi-
icrimitinfioii on the dnsis of sex which might itn-
emnle citizens of tin* stuff* in pursuing a husiness 
(ion. 
y International mny nol raise tin* •fiifslion of 
••• I'niiili Act is oie-oiisfifnf M»M;IIIV vague or over 
liis Court ns it fnid*i| to timely mist* flu* issue in 
court. Rotary lufcrnalional mny not assert Hint 
ll A i l is liueoitstif ul ionallv vague liecan^e Ihe 
not vague lis opplieil 1o if. K in ; i l l \ , flit* CliMlh 
tiuconstitiit ioimllv overliroinl. 
• I 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A SUB-
STANTIAL FEDERAL QUESTION 
A. Rotary International Cannot Assert a Con-
stitutional Right of Intimate Association. 
This nisi* presents issues already di-cided hy (his Court 
in Huberts t. IH'IVII Slates .huteees. 4(M t \K. WW (I!W4). 
That decision held that tin* rnnstitntion protects freedom 
of iissofinlioii in two forms - freedom of intimate associa-
tion mi.I freedom of expressive association. -MM C.S. at 
1117 l!IM. According to Hie court, "certain intimate human 
relationshi|is must lie secure*I against nnilue intrusion hy 
the Slate hecausc of the role of such relationship* in safe-
guarding the individual rreeilom Hint is eenlral lo our con-
stitutional scheme*' (MM l \ S . at I»I7-(SI8) ami the Con-
stitution guarantees a right to associate for the purpose 
of cngiiging in aelivilies protcetci! hy the first nmend-
men! s|ieechv nssemhly. petition for the redress of griev-
jtuccs, ami the exercise oT religion. However, the court up 
held npplifali"n of the Minnesota pulilic accommodations 
statute which proliiliitcd Hie Juycee* from denying fwll 
iiM*mliershi|i to women heeause the .Inycees was not an 
organization which eoiihl assert a eoiistitutioiial right of 
intimate association ami Minnesota9!! coiii|»elling interest 
in prohibiting discrimination against its female citizens 
jusfif'ieil ;m\ impitf*f on the .laycees* freeilom of expressive 
assoriaf ion. 
The decision of the California Court of Appeal helow 
is consistent with this Court's decision in Huberts ami 
merely involve application of the principles in Hnberls lo 
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Constitutional Guarantee! Do Wot Protect 
Private Discrimination. 
(Htffll the Constitution d w s recognize rights of 
IIIKI expressive nssiN'ialioiK these constitutional 
es have never IN-CII held In include an affirmative 
discriminate. 
he contrary, thin Court has held on numerous 
I flint private discrimination is unworthy of eon-
il protection. Thin issue WHS first addressed by 
t in llit* conlfxt of discrimination by labor oignni-
In Itaitmifi Mnil Jssoriafion r. Cm si, .TJI5 U.S. KS 
lis Court upheld I lie application of New York's 
o\mcnt law to such an mgnni/iitioii, rejecting tlit* 
lliat such discrimination was protected against 
crfcrencc liy the fourteenth amendment. This 
efusnl to extend constitutional protection to pri-
-rimitiation continued in Xonroorf r. Ilnnis»n. 
155 (I!t7:t) where this Court affirmed that a slate 
loan textbooks to a segregated school, saving: 
'I Although the Constitution docs not proscribe 
tte bins, it places no value on discrimination as it 
on the values inherent in (he Free Fxcreise 
<e. Invidious private discrimination may he char 
ized as a form of exercising freedom of associa-
|iroterteil liy the First Amendment, hut it has 
• heen accorded affirmative constitutional pro-
ms." /</.. at 4fi!l-70. 
larly. in l(nn>t»H r. MrCnmt. 427 U.S. IHI. I7<5 
lolding that 42 I'.S.C. '. PXI prohibits piivale 
'MIII denying admission on the ha-is of race, this 
•ted the language cited ahove in Xoiwood #•. Unt-
il distinguished hetween the protected Fir? I 
!1 
Amendment right to advocate segregated SCIMHIIS, ami the 
usserteil right to exclude students on the basis of race, re-
jecting the latter. 
This issue was addressed most reeently in If islam r. 
Kinti if NiMhlhtfi. 41\7 U.S. K!> TI^Mt), where this Court 
upheld the application of Title VII to the partnership 
decisions of a law firm, rejecting the claim that regulation 
of the firm's employment practices violated constitutional 
guarantees. IT any constitutional restriction* applied to 
the regulation of relatioiishi|ts which •'touch or concern** 
rights of privacy or association, these restriction* would 
certainly lie at their |ieak ns to the intimate choice of part-
ners in a law firm. Rotary International has no claim of 
an intimate relationship with the more than !Mai#fKHi btcal 
cluli members from whom it receives dues payments, ami 
thus the Constitution does not protect its desire to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex in memhership. 
While n constitutionally protected ••/.one of privacy** 
protecting private discrimination hr* lieen discussed by 
some members of the Supreme Court tsee IUU r. Mfirjt* 
o W . ;i7H U.S. 22t!f :ii:i (I !M»4) (Uohllierg, J., concurring) 
and Uonsr l.o,h,r Sn. 7 r. In is. 4117 U.S. 1ltt. 17!' ISO 
(l!*7'J) (Douglas, •'•• dissenting)), this projiositioii has 
never heen applied by this Court to approve discrimina-
tory practices. Indeed. Ibis Court has consistently refused 
to interfere with slate regulation of private discrimina-
tion. 
tMher slate courts have held that private dubs may 
not discriminate in violation id" state public accommoda-
tion statutes. Sn\ e.g.. Commonwealth of /'< nnstfli tiHtit. 
Human H< lot tons (\wnnissioit r. homil Onlrr of .1/no.vr, 
10 
otlfir So. tor. 44R Tn. 451
 r 294 A.2d 594 (1972). np|n»nl 
iHtiiiKKiMl for want of a substantial federal iptcstimi, 4n!» 
.S. 10.VJ (1972). in which flu* same Huh discussed in 
!iwse Lot!fiv So. 107 r. Inis, 407 U.S. Hill, was held siili-
rct to a Mate r i r i l rights law: H.I'.O.E. Lmhic So. JiH't 
f Bnnfiwiik v. fftfirnlrffNi. 297 A.2d 1107, 1114 l\\:% (Me. 
972) t appeal dismissed Tor waul of a substantial federal 
uestinn, 410 U.S. 9011 (1972). in which the |mwer or a 
tate to rcgnlntc discrimination by a private chili was 
igain upheld; ami, Note, Sri lino lust ami the Thirteenth 
Amendment aflvr HHHOOH I \ MrCrani, 29 Stan. h. Kev. 
U7f 759 (1977) (#t 11*1 m u t e clubs ninnot successfully 
•laim either the right of association or Hit* right to pri-
racy-"). 
Since assertion* of constitutional protection Tor dis-
criminatory membership ami guest |iolicics or truly pri-
vate clubs have been rejected, there is certainly no such 
protection for Hotnrjr International, an association of 
clubs which itscir has no human mcmliers. 
0. If Any Constitutional Rights are Infringed, 
California has a Compelling Interest which 
Justifies Such Infringement. 
Assuming any constitutional rights are infringed by 
a state's prohibition of discriminatory membership prac-
tices, the validity of the state9s action can onl\ he deter-
mined after the state's interest is balaueed u*r:iiust the 
nature and decree or the intrusion. As described in An-
derson l\ Velelnvzzv. 4• *•• • I'.S. 7*U, 7S!I (lim:',!, the :ni;il\ 
tical process the court inns! employ is to id<nfd'\. ev;ilu;itc 
anil weigh the countervailiui: interests. As this INnirl eon 
eluded in Hohvrls: 
11 
The right to associate for expressive purposes 
is nolf however, absolute, lufrimremeiits on that riirht 
may IN* justified by regulations adopts! to serve 
Coui|icHiug state interests, unrelated to tilt* suppression 
of if leas, that cannot \n* achieved through means sig-
nificant Jy less restrictive of associntioiuil freedoms. 
We are |»orsundcd that Minnesota9* wm|iel1iiij* in-
terest in eradicating discrimiuafiou against its female 
citizens justifies the iui|tact that application or the 
statute to the .laycees may have on the male mcm-
liersf associatinnnl freedoms. |Citations omitted.) 
4fW U.S. at IfcEI. 
Public policy in California strongly favors elimina-
tion or discrimination based on sex. Koire r. Metro Cor 
Wash, 40 Cal.Hd at MUM. The Cnruh Act expressly pro-
hibits sex discrimination by business enterprises and has 
been applied to invalidate policies that tliscriminate on tin1 
bases id sex ami public accommodations. Ishi.strr r. Hoys' 
Chib of Saola Croc. lor.. 40 f a l . t d 72 (I9s;i) . 
As recognized in a landmark decision by the Call for 
nia Supreme Court, which led the nation in establishing 
thai discrimination on the hn*is of sex is subject to tin 
most rigorous scrutiny. %%sc\ alone may not be used t< 
bar a person from a vocation, profession or business.1 
Sail'er hm. hie. r. Kirln, (1971) Ti Cal .M I . S. The n.in 
further stated: • ' | T | h e ri»ht to work ami tin* coiienmilaii 
oppuituuitx to nchie>e economic seeuritx and stability nr 
essential to the |Mirsuit of life, hb«rt\ :r»,| t*:ip|ion«s* ** 
Cnl.."»d at 17. The court below extended lhi< concern t 
include the discriminatory policies of an association wide 
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14 
consider a fitlrrnt unestion which was mil presented lo fin* 
ntnle courts M o w . MVbfc •». MVffb, 4f>1 U.S. 4!Mf !!•:• 
(1!W1): Cardinal*- v. State of Louisiana. IVM U.S. 4.17, I.ts 
(1969). 
Notary International never asserted (tint (he t'ttritfi 
Act was unconstitutionally vague or ovcrhroad in HIM stair 
court*. It did mnkc nn argument lutsed on "uncertainly" 
in its |*tttion for rehearing in the California Court of Ap 
peal tint linger California law this issue was nol timeU 
raised (Itulc 1*1 ( l ) ) ( l ) , California Utiles of Court). This 
Court will not hear n ipiestinn that was not timely raised 
tinder state Inw. Exxon Corp v. Eaqertmi. AiVl U.S. I7U. 
181 n.3 (1983); Itaifrg v. Anderson. Ittfi U.S. SKI, 2l!.V:!ii7. 
B. The Unruh Act is Not Vague as Applied to 
Rotary International. 
Under the void Tor vagueness doctrine l € lo]ne to 
whose conduct a statute eleurly applies may not success 
fully challenge it for vagueness." Parker r. Lertf, 417 
U.S. 7:W. 75fi I1JI741. The Unruh Art expressly prohibits 
discrimination on the hnsis of sex. Notary International 
sought to require Dunrtc lo discriminate on (he hnsis of 
sex, thus Rotary International cannot claim that the Unruh 
Act is %arue as applied to it. 
0. The Unruh Act is Not Unconstitutionally 
Overhroad. 
Appellants argue that the Unruh Act is unconslitu 
tionully ovcrhroad liecniise it has a chilling effect on the 
first amemlmeiit nss«»« lutional rights oT all groups in Cali 
fornia which are not open In the general puMic. This 
Court need not consider this claim. 
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This Court has applied the overhreadth doctrine 
••sparingly and only ns a last resortff to strike down stat-
utes which on their face may chill first amendment rights. 
Itmmhirk i\ OUnlmma. 41.1 U.S. WHf ISCI (I!l7:i). This 
Court has slated its reluctance to strike down a statute on 
its face where it may lie validly applied. Thus, in Parker 
•\ l^rtf, 417 U.S. 7.I4. where ap|»cllantvs actions felt within 
the ipicstinncd statute, this Court declined to find it over-
hroad slating: 
••. . . Thus even if there are marginal applica-
tions in which a statute would infringe on first amend 
meiit values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if 
the remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range 
of easily idcntifinhle and constitutionally pro<crihed 
conduct... . " 417 U.S. at 7«l. 
California courts have not interpreted the I t 
s" as to chill the first amendment rights of intimate a<«-
eiatiou anil expressive association recognized hy this Court 
in Itohertx. Clenrly the Unruh AcCs prohibition or urhi 
trary discrimination against define1 classes of person! 
IIIN*S not aim nt suppressing first amemlmeiit rights. Ii 
lloherls this Court rejected the suggestion that discrim 
iiuiton mcmliership |Nilicies are themselves "sytnlNil'u 
Hieeeh" snhject to firs! amendment protection. IHW U.S 
at 1527. 
In Uoherts the ,ln)cccs nrgm»d that the Mimical! 
puMic accommodations statute was uiictinslitntioiiall 
\ague and ovcrhroad. t.iUe the CIPUII Act at issue herei 
Ho* Minnesota statute ptohit»itcd dUci iniinatimi hy a "l»u* 
•ie-s*%. |i;s C.v:. nt i;i.V The Minnesota Supreme Com 
concluded that the .ta\coos was a husiness t»ecail<e it sol 
I!«MMU and extended privileges in exchange for annual men 
hership dues. 4IW U.S. at tilt?. This Court held that 11i 
Hi 
Minnesota AH, n* interpreted h\ its highest court, was nol 
iincoiis'itutiomilly vague and overbroad Iteeanse "the Min-
nesota Nupiemc t'otiit used ii numl»cr nl* specific ;titil oh 
jeclive rt ifITI;I iciraidin*: the m jxani/af ion's size, sclce-
tivitv. conmiereinl naluic, and use of public facilities 
typicnlU employed in deleiminiii" the applicability oT slate 
iififi federal antidiscrimination statutes lo the membership 
policies of nssortedly private t-liil»M.•• 4tW |T.S. tV2*X 
California court* have applied Just such specific and 
objective criteria in dctcrmiiiiiiK flint various orjrnni/n-
tiona, including Hotary International, arc subject to tin* |ln-
roll Art's prohibition of arbitrary discrimination. In 
Isbi.shr v. Hoys9 Club of Santa Cruz. hn\. 40 Cnl.hl 7 J, 
tin* California Supremo Court held that tin* Unrtih 
Act prohibited the Boy** Club from discriminating on the 
bonis of sex l**cause it provided an atmosphere deemed 
characteristic of a public accommodation, and members 
laeke.l a sense of "MOC'IHI cohesiveness, shared identity, or 
continuitytf. 40 Cal..7d at H1-H2. Similarly, in Cumin r. 
Mount Diablo Council of the lloif Smuts. 117 Cnl.App.rM 
12 (l9A*!)(app. clisni., 104 SCI. .T>74 (l!>K4», the court held 
hat the Hoy Scouts were subject to the tlnriih Art because 
tt like tin* Hoya'CIub, offered its facilities ami membership 
o the general |iublic. In addition to fnnisinirnn tin* public 
variability of fficnd»crship ami facilities, California courts 
ave also hold the Unruli Act to be applicable to nriranixn-
ions with commercial or businesslike attributes. Minimi 
*oint, Ltd. v. Wntfsnn, JWI CnL'ld 7:!l tlar-e apart 
lent complex) ; O'Cnunor r. I'Maifr (iimi On in is J\.\o#\, 
\\ Cal.rtil 7!M>, 7!Ci (I!»K:J) (Condominium owners9 a.-socio-
ion which |N?rformcd the customary Inactions of a land 
ml). 
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Thus, it can easily be diseeruetl that the prohibition* 
of tin* I'uruh A«| will applv to just the «<»rt of orirani/a 
lions described b\ thi* Court in ltnt<if% as not hcini; in 
the class of organizations.who«i< ritrhts of intimate and ex-
prossive association are protected by the first amendment 
and there is no risk I hat it will lie applied - i to n «mb*tnn-
tinl amount of protectee I conduct." «W U.S. at Kll. Kven 
if it is established that some eluh< not ofien to the jrencral 
public are subject to the Curiih Act. it iloes not follow that 
every |irivate club will IM\ Those CIUIM which are truly 
intimali* and |iersoiinl and which have few or no commer-
cial ntlributes are not subject to the lTiirnli Act nnd nmv 
continue to set such uicmliership |wilicic« as they choose. 
Those whose major fairpose is expressive activity subject 
to first amendment protection may set membership |*d-
icie« which are rationally related to their expressive ac-
tivities. Under California court interpretations or the 
Unrnh Act, the small group of intimate Friends who gather 
to play (inker have no fear that their right to freely and 
intimately associate will lie disturltcd by the lonp arm of 
the state even if they derive incidental business and pro-
fessional benefits from their association. 
I « 
CONCLUSION 
For the fnreiroinK reason*, ttir Slalc of Cnlifornin 
•jre« tliin Court to grant iip|*elleesf tiiolion In IIIHIIIIMS llio 
i|H*al or, in the nlternnttve, to aff irm llio ileeisinn helotv. 
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APPENDIX G 
?*vz$w»m$ 
e. The closer a wife's earnings are to her husband's the more likely she is to delay having 
children. 
f. Women who postpone childbirth display a solid attachment to the labor force both 
before and after their first child is born. 
g Early marriage is more of a deterrent to women's educational attainment than it is to 
men's 
h. As single women are the most likely labor force participants, the fact that more women 
•re delaying marriage suggests a higher overall participation rate for women. 
II. LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
1. Utah women have been steadily moving into the workplace since the turn of the century, 
and they currently participate in the labor force in record numbers. 
a In 1900. an estimated 13 percent of Utah's adult females worked outside the home 
b By 1940. almost a fourth of Utah women were.labor force participants 
c. In 1984. the Current Population Survey estimates that 54.4 percent of all Utah women 
16 years and older were either working or looking for a job. 
2 While it may seem that women have flooded into the job market im the last few years, 
actually the increase has been relatively steady. 
3 Utah's female participation rate registers higher than does the rate for the country as a 
whole, in spite of the fact that Utah women initially lagged behind the rest of the American 
women. 
4 Female rates tend to be understated as the average woman statistically outlives the average 
man 
5. Women 20 to 24 show the highest propensity to be labor force participants—their rate 
exceeds 70 percent 
6 More than half of Utah's married women have moved into the civilian labor force Mothers of 
young (preschool) children, while least likely of all categories to work, have joined the work 
force at the fastest rate and 45 percent are currently labor force participants 
7. Utah women made up 42 percent of the Utah civilian labor force in 1984 Between the years 
of 1950 and 1980 Utah's labor force expanded more than one and one-half times, women 
accounted for 62 percent of this growth 
6. The only instance in recent history when women have not sustained higher unemployment 
rates occurred in the 1982-83 recession when heavily male dominated industries (such as 
mining, construction, heavy manufacturing) experienced the brunt of the economic 
malaise 
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have eliminated the pay gap entirely Mincer and Polachek accounted for 70 percent of the gap 
between married men and women n A review of research relative to the wage gap by the National 
Academy of Sciences panel shows that in the studies reviewed, worker characteristics accounted for 
§tmost 44 percent of the differential " Duncan and Corcoran report that "less than half of the earnings 
gap can be explained by the kinds of differences in job commitment or work qualifications that could 
affect the earnings potential of any worker, male or female Most of the gap remains unexplamable and 
may indeed reflect some institutionalized discrimination against women in (he working world *>* 
Although this research suggests discrimination, the proposition itself is a difficult one to prove 
However, the fact remains, that after all measurable variables are included in earnings equations for 
women and men. there still remains a variance which is not removed 
Although women are moving into the professions, part of the problem lies in the fact that women don't 
seem re fce promoted as qukkly as men Even as continuously employed women get older, their 
earnings oo not rise as rapidly as men's d a One study came to the cancLision that the major cause of 
th£ female earnings deficit could be attributed to the failure of women to rise as fast as men with the 
same amount of education in the same occupation n 
The Salt Lake Tribune recently reported on an essay prepared by two Smith College economists-
Susan Boslego Carter and Michael Carter They entitled their work, "Women's Recent Progress in the 
Professions or. Women Get a Ticket to Ride After the Gravy Tram Has Left the Station " The Carters 
po»nt out that while in the past a person's first job was a pretty good forecaster of the quality of their 
future career, this has not proved to be the case for many women A growing number of economists, 
including the Carters, feel that a "two-track" job system is emerging The first track offers good paying 
job* with high prestige and an opportunity TUT advancement O M h e other hand, the second track 
(jobs in the same occupation) is creating a new class of routine, low-paying jobs, unconnected to 
promotion ladders Women seem to be ending up in the second track of these professional jobs For 
example about three-fourths of male doctors are "office-based" compared to just overlnatf df female 
doctors Physicians in private practice would generally have the highest potential for high incomes A 
Similar pattern is occurring in business Many feel that while women are making irroads educationally 
and into middle management, their advancement into top management is being stymied v 
Myra Strober. director of Stanford's Center for Research on Women, explains that one basic problem 
is that male executives tend to choose successors who are like themselves M Women who do succeed 
such as Mary Cunningham, are often faced with a subtle form of sexual harassment that attempts to 
undermine their credibility by assuming that the only way a woman gets ahead quickly is through 
sexual favors 
One result of the Duncan and Corcoran study suggests that although men were a little more likely to 
have QOtten their jobs through, shall we say the "old bov network.TJITB on acTuai earnings turned UD 
little evidence that this road leads to substantially higher pay for either sex However they did find that 
men were more likely to obtain positions with longer training periods (which may eventually lead to 
higher pay) The researchers also discovered that the earnings of those who merely supervise their 
co-workers don't differ ail that much from nonsupervisory personnel However, jobs with authority to 
hire. fire, and promote were associated with a 20 percent higher pay rate Only about one in ten 
working women compared to one in four working men had authority over the pay and promotion of 
others Duncan and Corcoran point out. "In fact many theorists see such hierarchical authority 
structures as the means of preserving an existing social or economic structure, often implying the 
existence of some form of discrimination or inequity "n 
Young unmamed mothers make up a large portion of the poor Although fertility among teenagers is 
actually dropping (like the fertility rate m general), pregnant teenagers are less likely to get married or 
give their babies up for adoption than before Mothers who married young or not at all are usually 
•M-eguipped to find jobs which pay enough to support themselves and their children, particularly m a 
aociety that generally pays women less than men 
A recent (Ma'Ch 1983) study found that almost one-fourth of U S working women who maintained 
families had not completed high school compared to 15 percent of working wives Women with 
children under the age of s«* are limited by the high cost of child care and the additional problems 
associated with raising children with only one parent The same survey found that the unemployment 
rate for mothers with preschoolers was 23 percent compared with 15 percent for mothers whose 
youngest child was at least school age * However, women maintaining famihesdoshowa very strong 
commitment to the labor force Seventy-five percent of mothers maintaining families whose youngest 
child was school age participated m the work force 
Other women who face income problems are "displaced homemakers'* divorced deserted or 
wiaowec women whose children are over 18 thus making them ineligible for Aid to Families w tn 
Dependent Children (AFDC) Many times these women have been out of the labor force and ou* of 
school for many years and have few visible marketable job skills Women aged 65 and older also ma*e 
up a large share of impoverished females 
IN CONCLUSION 
Women have averaged m the last three decades only 60 percent of their male counterpart s earnings 
Data suggests tna* this pay gap may be even wider for Utah women Although the gap has narrowed 
slightly m recent yeafs some economists believe this constriction was an anomaly Regardless of 
education experience or occupation women earn less than men Even so they contribute 
substantially to their family s income Many reasons have been advanced to account for the wage 
differentia'mciudmg differences »n work history educational content occupation manta! patterns 
and productivity However no reliable research has been able to account for more than 70 percent of 
the gap base:: on these characteristics This fact points to the existence of some sort of 
institutionalized discrimination agamst woman but does not prove it The female male wage 
differential the fact that many women lack the skills to obtam a good job and the increased numpers 
of women who are heads of families without male support has led to increased poverty among women 
and the'' chiio'en 
